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ABSTRACT 
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers has issued guidelines for methods 
using risk based infonnation to develop optimization of inspection and maintenance. 
These guidelines have been applied to a thermal power plant data to develop optimization 
of maintenance and inspection. 
The optimization of maintenance and inspection is becoming increasingly important 
especially in oil fired thennal power plants as the fuel cost is on the rise. High production 
impact components such as, waterwall tubes, superheater tubes, reheater, forced draft fan, 
boiler feed pump, and condenser have been considered for developing component 
replacement optimization. An optimized inspection program has been developed for 
waterwall tubes. The financial implications of both maintenance optimization through 
component replacement and inspection optimization have been calculated in terms of Net 
Present Value for presentation to the corporate office. A link between the Engineering 
world and corporate world is established. 
This work begins at the analysis of field data of each component using Least 
Squares Approach to obtain Shape Factor and Characteristic Life for Weibull 
distribution. With the aid of Weibull distribution, probability of failure is calculated. 
Time ordered influence diagram is drawn for maintenance optimization. A decision 
ii 
model is developed to determine the maximum Net Present Value for the Optimization of 
Inspection. 
This work further demonstrates the application of ASME guidelines, Volume 3, 
(1994) 'Fossil fuel fired electric power generating station applications, Risk based 
inspection' to field data Weibull reliability model using Excel spreadsheets. This work 
has established a simple easy to use means of developing maintenance and inspection 
optimization. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
a intercept 
~ shape parameter 
CA alternate case cost 
Cs base case cost 
Cp project cost 
r (x) gamma function 
A hazard rate 
NPV Net Present Value 
a standard deviation 
cr2 variance 
1- regression coefficient 
e characteristic life 
z standardized nonnal variate 
f(t) probability density function 
F (t) cumulative distribution function 
R (t) reliability function 
Rs (t) component reliability for S spares 
A (t) hazard rate function 
c carbon 
CH4 methane 
v 
Fe iron 
Fe3C iron carbide 
Fe304 magnetite 
H2 hydrogen 
H20 water 
Na sodium 
NaOH sodium hydroxide 
02 oxygen 
OH hydroxide 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The application of Risk Assessment to the field of engineering is not a new 
practice. Mechanical Engineers in the 191h century evaluated the reliability and safety of 
operating boilers. Boiler codes were developed after studying the causes and effects of 
boiler related accidents. Those mechanical engineers were in effect performing 
qualitative and quantitative risk assessment. The formal risk assessment came into 
existence after the nuclear power industry started to conduct risk assessments to their 
plants. The nuclear industry in the United States has been using probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) following the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Reactor 
Safety Study (W ASH-1400) (1975). This study identifies seven basic tasks in reactor 
safety. This has become the model for other industrial risk assessments. Figure 1.1 
describes the seven steps to be followed in the risk assessment of nuclear reactors. When 
this study was done its results were contested because of its societal implications. 
However the methodology used in the study has not been questioned so far. No uniform 
terminology for risk assessment existed prior to 1984 because of the interdisciplinary 
nature of the discipline. The National Academy of Sciences in the United States and the 
Royal Society in the United Kingdom were two organizations among others, who 
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attempted to develop a consensus on the objectives, the process, and the tenninology 
used in risk assessment. 
Identification Fission Distribution Health 
of accident product of source in effect and 
sequences 1 -+ source ~ the ~ property 
released from environment damage 
~~ containment 4 5 
3 
~~ 
Assessment of 
Analysis probability Overall risk of other values .. assessment 7 
2 risks 6 
Figure 1.1: Seven Basic Tasks in Reactor Safety Study (Rasmussan, 1975) 
Probabilistic structural mechanics (PSM) provide tools for assessing the risk and 
reliability of components and structures. PSM established the nondestructive examination 
criteria. PSM deals with the application of microscopic assessment of components to 
address the mechanistic uncertainties such as stress, load and material properties. PRA 
and PSM need to be applied together in evaluating the risk of a component. The 
inspection of boiler tubes will require PSM established methods such as, ultrasonic 
thickness measurement, ultrasonic flaw detection, and low frequency electromagnetic 
thickness measurement. 
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers recognizing the need for 
developing risk based codes and standards, formed a Risk Analysis Task Force in 1985. 
This task force recommended a research program to detennine how can risk based 
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methods be used to develop inspection requirements and guidelines for the maintenance 
of systems and components. The Task Force members put in place a work plan in 1988. 
The guidelines developed by ASME in 1991 are comprised of the following documents: 
1. Volume-1 General Document Risk Based Inspection Development of Guidelines 
2. Volume-2 Light Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plant risk Based In-service Testing. 
3. Volume-3 Fossil Fuel Fired Electric Power Generating Station Applications Risk 
Based Inspections 
4. Risk Based Methods for Equipment Life Management An Application Handbook 
Other Societies were also developing Risk Based Inspection Codes. The American 
Petroleum Institute in May, 1993 initiated a Risk Based Inspection Project. API issued 
the following documents: 
a. Risk Based Inspection Base Resource Document API 581 in May, 2000 
b. Risk Based Inspection API Recommended Practice 580 in May, 2001 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of this work is to develop an optimal maintenance inspection 
plan for an actual industrial plant using risk based approach. A thermal power plant is 
used as a case study to illustrate the methodology. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
The guidelines developed by the ASME and the API will be used as the main 
tools to develop the optimal maintenance policy. Risk is will be measured in terms of the 
3 
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net present value. This will make the results more easy to understand and appreciate for 
people in the industry. 
The methodology consists of the following steps: 
Step-1: Obtaining Failure Data 
Step-2: Ranking Failure Data 
Step-3: Evaluating the constants, 'Shape Factor' and 'Characteristic Life' for 
Weibull distribution 
Step-4: Evaluating the failure rate and consequences 
Step-5: Estimate cost/benefit analysis for replacement of defective component 
Step-6: Inspection development and optimization. 
1.4 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
The research reported in this thesis focuses on the use of the ASME and API 
guidelines to a existing thermal power plant. The failure data from eight major 
components will be used to develop an optimal maintenance model. A cost benefit 
analysis is performed to assess the effectiveness of replacement versus maintenance. 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter -1 Provides a background of the research study. It also states the scope and 
objectives of the thesis. 
Chapter-2 Reviews the technique available to develop a risk based inspection program. 
Discusses the process for developing a risk based inspection. This includes 
4 
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system definition, qualitative risk assessment, quantitative risk analysis, 
failure modes, effects and criticality analysis methodology and inspection 
program development 
Chapter-3 Discusses the theory applied to Risk Based Inspection technique. The time 
dependent failure model is explained. The Weibull Distribution is discussed. 
Determination of the 'Shape Factor' and 'Characteristic life' from the data 
using the 'Least Squares Fit is explained. 
Chapter-4 Provides the System description of the Boiler and the failure data obtained for 
Superheaters, Waterwalls, and Reheater, Forced Draft Fan, Boiler Feed Pump, 
Boiler Feed Pump Recirculation Valve, and Condenser Tubes. 
Chapter-S Qualitative Risk Assessment is done for the Boiler Components. Based on 
engineering judgment, failure probabilities and consequences are estimated. 
The Qualitative Risk Matrix is drawn based on the failure probabilities and 
consequences. 
Chapter-6 The available data for Superheater, Waterwalls, Reheater, Forced Draft Fan, 
Boiler Feed Pump, Boiler Feed Pump Recirculation Valve, and Condenser 
Tubes are quantitatively analyzed. Failure probability is established. 
Chapter-7 Financial optimization is done to have the component replaced by calculating 
Net Present Value. Time Ordered Influence Diagram for the Maintenance 
Optimization is developed. 
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Chapter-8 Optimum Inspection Program is developed. After considering the various 
damage mechanisms and inspection procedures the best strategy for 
inspection is developed for Waterwalls. 
Chapter-9 Conclusions and recommendations are provided in this chapter. 
References and appendices are also included in the thesis. 
6 
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Chapter 2 
REVIEW OF RISK BASED METHODOLOGIES 
2.1 RISK BASED INSPECTION 
Risk assessment has existed in some fonn or other in industry and commerce for a 
long time. The first paper on risk assessment was written subsequent to a study by the US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for fonnal application to the Nuclear Plants. It consisted 
of seven steps (Rasmussan, 1975). American Society of Mechanical Engineers extended 
the Risk assessment to Inspections based on Risk Assessment and developed general 
guidelines. The risk based inspection consisted of four parts according to ASME general 
guidelines (ASME, 1991 ). Subsequently, ASME issued guideline specific to Nuclear and 
Fossil Fuel fired Plants. ASME expanded the initial four parts guidelines to a five parts 
document for the Fossil Fired Plants. The addition of an extra part is due to substantial 
industry data, risk assessment models, inspection infonnation and structural and 
economic models, currently being proposed for fossil power plants. API published 
recommended practice 580 for risk based inspection in 2002 (API 580, 2002). API 580 
suggests eleven steps. API has included extra steps such as 'Other Risk Mitigation 
Activities', 'Reassessment and Updating', 'Roles, Responsibilities, Training and 
Qualification' and ' Documentation and Updating'. The five steps of the ASME 
guidelines for Fossil Fired Plants are enumerated and discussed below. 
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The five steps are: 
1. System definition consists of boundaries, success criteria, data collection from plant 
and obtaining generic data. 
2. Qualitative risk assessment consists of system tabulation with components, 
estimation of failure probabilities, consequences and drawing risk matrix. 
3. Quantitative risk assessment consists of obtaining and combining data for data 
analysis. 
4. Multiple component ranking based on optimization consists of influence diagrams, 
decision trees and spread sheet models. 
5. Inspection program development consists of strategy tables, influence diagrams, 
decision trees, decision models and best strategy determination. 
8 
SYSTEM DEFINITION 
Boundaries 
Success Criteria 
Step- I 
INFORMATION ASSEMBLY 
Collect Data from Plant 
Explore Generic Data 
Format Data 
QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Tabulate Systems and Components 
Estimate Failure Probabilities 
Estimate Failure Conscquc.:nces 
Qualitative Risk Matrix 
Step-2 
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................ ·- ...... -- ....... -................................. -.................... "' 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
OBTAINING AND COM BIN lNG 
DATA 
r--+1 ----~::: ~:W~~eedj:.~~::~:~h~~:~:S 
: Step-3 
II/ 
FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS 
Calculate probability and consequence 
Establish failure probability vs time 
MULTIPLE COMPONENT RANKING 
BASED UPON OPTIMIZATION 
Influence Diagrams 
Decision Trees 
Spreadsheet Models 
Step-4 
INSPECfiON PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
Strategy Tables 
Influence Diagrams 
Decision Trees 
Decision Model 
Determine best strategy 
Step-S 
Figure 2.1: Risk Based Inspection Methodology (ASME, 2003) 
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2.1.1 SYSTEM DEFINITION 
System definition is the first step in identifying the components to be inspected and 
defining the purpose of the inspection. A system is an identifiable entity that has a 
production function. In a risk based inspection process for a fossil plant the first step is to 
establish the system and its boundaries. A system is characterized by two main concepts: 
the boundary and the success criteria. The boundary specifies the components which 
constitute. The success criteria define the expected performance the system. In order to 
define meaningful boundaries, the operational or safety criteria used for system 
definitions should be defined on the same basis as the available data. System 
unavailability is caused by failure. Failure scenarios are tied to the mode of operation. 
System success is defined on the basis of the corresponding mode of operation. Fossil 
power plants are designed to perf01m specific functions. Thus it is necessary to define 
their physical and performance or functional boundaries. Sub-systems or components 
necessary for the successful operation of the plant in one operating mode may become 
redundant or standby units in another operating mode. For example, a feedwater pump 
system comprising three pumps is fully operational at full power with all the three pumps 
running. The same system at less than full power contains one redundant pump with two 
pumps running; the third is a standby unit available on demand. At full power, the 
performance boundary reflects the availability of all the three pumps. At partial power, 
the performance boundary reflects the operational availability of two out of three units 
and the availability upon demand for the third unit. 
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A system's perfonnance is influenced by its components. All the components 
should be identified and their influence on the system perfonnance. For example, a boiler 
can be considered as a system or as a component. If the forced outages are due to tube 
failures, the question arises as to which tubes whether, superheater, waterwall or reheater. 
When boiler is defined as a system the resources required can be reduced to a 
manageable level as the focus would be on the component of the boiler. Therefore a 
system should be defined such that it contains all the critical components. 
Success criteria should be defined along the lines of forced outage rate between 
statutory inspections or economic outages. 
A system definition requires the specifications of each component, materials of 
construction, operating and design parameters and history. The difficulty is that most 
plants do not have all the data about the components in the plant due reorganizations in 
the plant or new record keeping systems being brought in. Some plants have excellent 
data acquisition systems but others have none. If plant data are not available generic data 
can be used to begin the program. The program can then be modified using the actual 
data collected for the plant. 
2.1.2 QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Qualitative risk assessment is a screening technique based on plant specific or 
generic data and assumptions that are used to evaluate accident sequences, frequencies, 
and consequences. The objective of this part of the process is to identify and rank the 
importance of the equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe and efficient 
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operation based on the availability of the plant systems and the impact of their failure 
during nonnal operation or on demand. The qualitative analysis is perfonned through the 
use of systematic deductive procedures such as failure modes and effect analysis, hazard 
and operability analysis, fault tree analysis, master logic diagrams and what if analysis. 
The use of those tools facilitates the identification of the systems, the important 
components in each system, the failure modes of these components and how they in tum 
affect the system. Some procedures (e.g. FMEA) are more effective in examining the 
components that make up the system. The major steps in qualitative procedures are 
selecting a deductive procedure (FMEA) (ASME, 1991), identifying the system, 
tabulating system components, identifying and listing failure modes of each component, 
identifying effects of component failures on the system, classifying likelihood of failure 
of each failure mode, classifying consequences for each failure mode and ranking 
system/subsystem/component failure mode based on likelihood and consequences. For 
example, failure mode of waterwall tube is tube defonnation in the fonn of metal 
elongation and reduction in the wall area or cross section. This failure mode could be due 
to short tenn overheating (failure mechanism). In fact short tenn overheating is the 
immediate cause while the loss of coolant or excessive boiler gas temperature may act as 
contributing factors. Further analysis of the contributing causes may identify that loss of 
coolant or excessive boiler gas temperature are caused by any of the following factors, 
internal tube blockage, low water level, loss of coolant due to upstream tube failure and 
overfiring ofbumers (Lamping 85). Some of the root causes that will lead to the blockage 
failure mechanisms are scale deposits, repair debris, steel shot, pre boiler oxides, deposits 
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from carryover or loose bolts, nuts and plates inside the tube. Qualitative risk 
assessment ranks the problems according to its importance. There may be more than one 
solution to the problem. In this case, either the problem or the solution needs to be ranked 
in importance. Even in a narrowly defined system say, superheater, some tubes are more 
important than others. The tubes failing due to ash erosion are more frequent than those 
due to creep. The failure mode needs to be identified to perform qualitative risk 
assessment. The failure probability for each component is estimated based on different 
failure modes. The failure probability will be classified as "high", "medium", and "low". 
For example, the failure probability of water wall tubes is high and that of condenser 
tubes are medium. 
At this step, the importance of risk based methodology is evident. Using risk, 
instead of probability or only consequence cost, provides the ability to identify what is 
required to meet the success criteria. The quantitative analysis provides further an ability 
to focus on those problems which have the most adverse effect on production. A risk 
matrix is prepared comprising of probability and consequence severity. 
2.1.3 QUANTITAIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Quantitative risk analysis methods are used to integrate the numerous engineering 
disciplines to prioritize and develop programs for the inspection of components and 
structural elements. Some of the engineering disciplines include non-destructive 
examination, fracture mechanics analysis, system and component design, and operation 
of facilities. Risk based models are developed by expanding on the logic that is used in 
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the qualitative risk assessment process to quantify the frequency of component/system 
failure and direct and indirect consequences of failures. Probabilities of component 
failure that are based on component material, potential degradation mechanisms and 
loading conditions are also factored into the model. The overall model is used to identify 
the most important systems and their components for inspection using quantitative 
measures. The quantitative methodology which can be based on safety or economic risk 
is then used to prioritize all the components or elements of interest. Once the components 
are prioritized, inspection models are applied to evaluate appropriate inspection strategies 
for these components or structural elements. These models are used to evaluate the 
reliability and quality of inspections relative to potential failure criteria, e.g; leaks or 
catastrophic rupture. Economic models can be used to optimize the inspection program 
over multiple components across fossil units. The overall quantitative risk analysis 
approach has three basic steps; !.application of system assessment methods to prioritize 
components for inspection, 2. application of decision analysis models to evaluate the 
appropriate frequency, methods, and acceptance criteria for developing inspection 
programs, and 3. application of decision analysis models to optimize the inspection 
programs over multiple components based on safety and economic constraints. 
While evolving a quantitative analysis, "high", "medium" or "low" probability and 
consequence estimates will be replaced with failure probability and consequence in dollar 
values. The qualitative assessment only screens and does not identify the course of 
action. Risks of different units can not be compared in qualitative assessment. There is no 
ranking of importance for resources allocation among the same ranked projects in 
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qualitative assessment. The qualitative assessment does not provide financial or other 
quantitative information required to support recommendations. The quantitative risk 
assessment addresses these shortcomings of qualitative assessment. 
The failure consequence in terms of dollars can be obtained from a company's 
corporate office or from the plant administration. This information will be required later 
but at this stage failure rate probability with time is required. There are two class of data, 
one is specific data and the other is generic data. Specific data are obtained from the plant 
and pertains to a particular component. On the other hand Generic data is compiled 
information usually from an industry or a public source. This thesis uses plant specific 
data. The data and the failure modes are used for failure modeling and also to predict 
remaining life. Fault tree and event tree analysis will be required in case the relationship 
between component failure and mission failure is not clear. 
2.1.4 MUTIPLE COMPONENT RANKING BASED UPON OPTIMAZATION 
In the initial quantitative assessment, the risk ranking is quite simple. As the fossil 
powered plants are concerned mainly about megawatt (MW) generated, the production 
loss is the criterion that determined the rank. A different output measure can be used if a 
different kind of facility is analyzed. In this step, the economic and safety factors are 
accounted for. A decision analysis model is developed to evaluate inspection and 
replacement decisions to maximize net present value while addressing the budget 
constraints. This model will, based, on unit need optimally balance resources among 
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components and units and help develop a complete productive resource management 
strategy. A component replacement strategy is also developed. 
2.1.5 INSPECTION PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
An inspection program is developed after having determined the components and 
their acceptable net present value. The year of inspection is decided. Inspections along 
with the information on the risk provide confidence in the reliability of the component. 
Inspections reduce uncertainty in the risk assessment. An inspection strategy is developed 
to optimize risk. The method, sample size, the access and the type of inspection will be 
the factors that produce a strategy for examining a component. The costs involved in the 
inspection and access will be taken into account. The inspection program starts with 
either "do nothing" or "arrange inspections". 
Multiple component ranking based upon optimization and inspection program 
development use spreadsheet models to help make decisions. Sensitivity analysis is a tool 
that will identify the variables that have the greatest effect on the final decision i.e. 
maximizing the net present value. 
2.2 REVIEW OF WORK DONE ON RISK ASSESSMENT 
Rasmussan, et al ( 197 5) developed the basic seven tasks for the assessment of 
reactor safety. He used event trees to analyze the damage likely to be caused by a pipe 
breakage. He investigated the property damage, cancer fatalities, and early fatalities for 
100 reactors per year of failure probability. This initial work forms the basis for this 
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thesis and the probability distribution developed for property damage and other failures 
inform the researcher the necessity of a probability distribution when determining the 
risk. There was no mention of employing risk for calculating failure probability of 
equipment. Subsequent to this initial paper, risk began to play a major role in equipment 
maintenance along with safety. 
Moghissi (1984) states that "Risk analysis is a complex and logical process and like 
any other branch of science and engineering must be refined by the devotion of time, 
effort and resources". He termed political and legal constraints as uncertainty of risk 
value. The importance of the cost impact, and cost/benefit analysis well described in this 
article are the basis for developing optimized programs for component replacement and 
inspection. As this an early work, the cost/benefit analysis is viewed as benefits derived 
from reduction in risk. There is no thought given to other expenses that will result when 
projects are undertaken to reduce risk. The principle of corporate finance such as net 
present value needs to be applied when assets are either modified or replaced to reduce 
risk. 
Vo ( 1989) used data from existing probabilistic risk assessments for eight 
representative nuclear power plants to identify and prioritize the most relevant systems 
for plant safety. Inspection importance ranking was calculated for eight systems. The 
objective was to assess current in service inspection requirements for pressure boundary 
systems and components and to develop recommendations for improvements. This study 
used failure probabilities based on historical data. According to Vo rigorous failure 
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analysis (eg. fracture mechanics calculations using actual plant specific information) will 
shift the system importance results. Systematic evaluation of the sensitivity of the results 
to plant specific design factors and operating procedures should be made. This study 
demonstrated the feasibility of using risk based methods to develop plant specific 
inspection plans. 
Rettedal ( 1990) discussed the integration of structural reliability analysis and 
quantitative risk assessment by adopting Bayesian approach. This paper used data 
provided by experts. His paper concluded that following the "classical Bayesian 
approach" the true objective risk, is estimated whereas in the "fully Bayesian approach", 
risk is a way of expressing uncertainty about future observable quantities. To estimate the 
true objective risk, the true probability of an accident event is used. To estimate just the 
risk, subjective probabilities are used to express the uncertainties of the occurrence or not 
of an accidental event, the number of accidental events in a given period of time or lost 
production in a period of time. The risk result is a total measure of uncertainty. The 
author of this work is of the opinion that there is a possibility that there will be variable 
results from one approach to the other approach. Rettadel calculated the navigational 
failure using both the approaches. He obtained a failure probability ranging from 0.01 to 
0.04 for the classical Bayesian approach whereas the failure probability was 0.013 for 
fully Bayesian approach. To eliminate unwanted variability in results from one analysis 
to the other, guidelines/standards related to methods and data are required. 
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Vesely (1993) used probabilistic risk assessment as a tool for maintenance 
prioritization applications. This paper focuses on PRA importance measures which can be 
useful for maintenance prioritization applications. Specific importance measures are 
identified which can be used to identify risk important maintenances. Risk importance 
maintenance is defined as maintenance that is necessary to avoid the risk sensitive to the 
proper functioning of the component. Two different measures are identified that can be 
used to determine risk important maintenances. One importance measure determines the 
risk importance of the maintenance based on the risk importance of the equipment being 
maintained. The other importance measure determines the importance of the maintenance 
based on the risk impact that would occur if maintenance were not carried out effectively. 
Two measures, minimal cutsets contribution and risk reduction importance were 
calculated. Using minimal cutsets or risk reduction importance, the basic events and their 
associated maintenance are prioritized for their risk level. A study should be made as to 
compare the results obtained in applying each importance measure. 
Vaurio (1995) presented a procedure for optimizing the test inspection and 
maintenance intervals of safety related systems and components. He analysed the 
downtime of a stand by system and the cost of the risk involved in the unavailability of 
the standby system while the system is tested. There is no data analysis in this paper. 
Component failures, common cause failures and human errors were included and 
modeled by basic events. Analytical solutions had been obtained for several risk models, 
such as component model, component group model and multiple system model 
illustrating how different factors influence the optimization. The minimum risk 
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acceptable for the loss of system needs to be studied for effective application of the 
models suggested in this paper. 
Nicholls ( 1995) developed the risk assessment package for Koeberg Nuclear 
Power Station, South Africa. His work is comprised of computerizing the manual 
probabilistic risk assessment done by the contractors. There were two main driving forces 
for this. One was to include some of the lessons learned concerning nuclear safety since 
the original study had been started some ten years ago. The other was to allow for a rapid 
analysis of the impact of changes to the plant. He developed the overall requirement to 
allow for an integral approach to risk assessment. He used plant data and wrote computer 
codes for component database, failure modes, fault tree, event tree, probabilistic risk 
assessment analysis and documented results for the nuclear power plant. The language 
used was PASCAL. ORACLE was chosen to hold the vast database. To link these two 
languages, ORACLE compatible FORTRAN was chosen. The code included a module to 
update the data with actual plant data by means of a Bayesian Analysis. Minimal Cutsets 
were generated. Value of the cutest, number of elements in the cutest, number of 
components in the cutest, number of locations in the cutest and the degree of common 
mode in the cutest were all considered before dropping a cutest. The probabilistic risk 
assessment integrated a number of event trees to determine the risk. This computerized 
system is useful to resolve conventional reliability issues. In a power plant there are many 
systems which provide various functions contributing to the successful operation of the 
plant. Most of these systems are interlinked and a failure of a system can cause an outage. 
The computerized system has all the event trees in the data base. Therefore the 
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computerized system is useful in detennining the failure of systems when a malfunction 
has occurred in one of the systems. The conventional reliability issues are the reliabilities 
of boilers, turbines, pumps, fans and condensers and can be developed for any process 
industry. A study to develop a similar system for a thennal plant should be done. 
Hagemeijr (1998) developed a methodology on the detennination of risk by 
evaluating the consequences and the likelihood of equipment failure. Likelihood of 
equipment failure was assessed by means of extrapolation for the future planned 
maintenance work to identify the corrective maintenance works. The objective was to 
optimize the inspection and maintenance to minimize risk in Brunei Petroleum plant. A 
new tenn called "integrity parameter" has been introduced. The reasons for introducing 
the integrity parameter are 1) the condition (state of integrity) of equipment can be 
directly expressed in tenns of measurable integrity parameter values. 2) the parameter 
values together with their acceptance limits can be used as equipment integrity 
perfonnance indicators. Such indicators are essential to drive inspection activities and 
corrective actions at task level. Since the parameter can be either physical (i.e. wall 
thickness) or non physical (i.e. trip settings) the concept is generally acceptable. Having 
defined the integrity parameters, the acceptance ranges (i.e. perfonnance limits to the 
parameter values) are established. The acceptance ranges are detennined by "fitness for 
purpose" analysis which takes into account the prevailing operational requirements and 
satisfying the safety standards related pressure containment. The deviation from 
acceptance ranges dictates the corrective action. The likelihood of failure with respect to 
time is obtained by the use of historical data and the integrity parameter value. Thus the 
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relative risk of equipment failure is evaluated and this is used to ptioritize the inspection 
activities. This procedure applies a qualitative consequence analysis to filter subsequent 
analysis. The integrity parameters have subdivided into critical integrity parameters and 
non critical integrity parameters. The fit for purpose approach should be studied for its 
acceptability in other process industries 
Hamly (1998) developed a risk ranked inspection recommendation procedure that 
was used by one of Exxon's chemical plants to prioritize maintenance works that had 
been identified during equipment inspection. The equipment were prioritized based on 
severity index which is failure potential combined with consequences .He assigned values 
to low, medium and high for consequences and probabilities. Thus a failure which titted a 
co-ordinate in the risk matrix had a value. He also assigned values to failure potential and 
consequences. He defined a severity index for each failure which combined all the values 
obtained for a failure and produced a new number indicating how severe the failure is. A 
study can be made whether such values can be assigned to other process industries 
Ponnambalam (2001) demonstrated the advantages of utilizing available data and 
knowledge of experts in assigning probabilities in estimating risk to manage regulation of 
stream flow. He used Bayesian rule in computing estimated risk while at the same time 
making choice of designs to ensure reliability. He has used real data and also simulated 
data in his paper. His procedure consists of specifying an acceptable failure rate an 
unacceptable failure rate and use a permitted number of failures to be used as a control 
variable. He has shown that statistical and stochastic analyses can be used to integrate 
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risk and reliability for system function design. A study should be pursued whether this 
approach can be made in process industries. 
Jovanovic (2001) reviewed the current practices and trends in the area of risk based 
inspection/ risk based life management plimarily by comparing European and US work. 
He highlighted the background and needs of industry and showed the relationship 
between risk based inspection/risk based life management and other possible approaches 
to maintenance. There is no data analysis in this report. Risk based life management of 
the plant is a concept which includes external damages, explosions and similar purely 
random causes. Therefore, an overall concept of RBI/RBLM should be specified. 
Available methods, tools, codes, standards etc should be embedded into the above 
concept. Additional needed methods, tools, etc should be developed and included into the 
new concept. Necessary steps towards the development of new codes, standards and other 
similar documents should be studied. 
Faber (2002) addressed the framework for risk based inspection planning (RBI) The 
RBI problem is summarized and the individual aspects of RBI are highlighted. The paper 
addresses the theoretical framework for risk based inspection and planning. There are no 
data analyses in this paper. The paper describes the uncertainties of inspection 
measurement attributed to deterioration and uncertain performance of inspection. There 
are other uncertainties such as basic variables, representing physical uncertainties, 
uncertainties related to new information, and finally the model uncertainties. The 
physical uncertainties are typically uncertainties associated with loading, environmental 
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exposure, geometry and material properties. The statistical uncertainties arise from 
incomplete statistical information, e.g. due to smaller number of material tests. The 
model uncertainties are due to the idealized mathematical descriptions used to 
approximate the actual physical behavior of the components. These uncertainties should 
study and procedures should be developed to accommodate these uncertainties while 
developing an inspection model. 
Krishnasamy, Faisal Khan and Haddara (2004) presented a methodology for 
designing maintenance programs based on risk. The methodology consisted of four parts, 
identification of scope, risk assessment, risk evaluation and maintenance planning. It was 
found that the steam generator, the high pressure feed water system and the air and flue 
gas systems were responsible for 62% of the overall risk of Unit-3 at Holyrood 
Generation Station. A schedule for preventive maintenance was developed. An 
acceptable risk criterion was developed. A study should be made to determine the 
contractual obligations of the utility when it fails to produce power due to a breakdown. 
This cost will add up to the down time cost. 
Brickstad (2005) showed the results of a benchmark study with five different 
Structural Reliability Models (SRMs) conducted in the frame of the European Project 
NURBIM (Nuclear Risk Based Inspection Methodology for passive components). Pipes 
of small, medium and large diameters were evaluated for failure probability in 40 years. 
The fatigue and stress corrosion crack were the two damage mechanisms under 
consideration. Five different softwares were applied to fifteen parameters to forecast the 
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occurrence of leaks and damages in 40 years. The paper states "The benchmark analyses 
are performed by first defining a baseline case and then varying each parameter one by 
one, keeping all other parameters fixed at their baseline values." This procedure of 
varying one parameter keeping the rest constant will not indicate the interaction between 
the parameters. Design of experiments principles should be applied to reflect the 
interaction between various parameters into consideration. The failure probability may 
have a different value when interaction between the fifteen parameters considered in this 
study. 
Conley (2005) discussed the application of risk assessment technology in general 
and more specifically risk based inspection. He applied RBI to ammonia storage and 
analyzed the hazards presented by corrosion or other ongoing degrading mechanisms. 
The method of risk presentation via 'risk matrix' expounded in this article was 
informative while developing the thesis. The example shown for risk as events/year, 
times $/event was used in this thesis while linking the engineering world to the corporate 
world. There were no data analyses as in this thesis. In the risk matrix the consequence is 
the area that would be affected by fire or explosion if flammables are released from a 
refinery. The consequences should be the area affected by ammonia release. This area 
would be a larger area if there is a downwind. Therefore, the release of ammonia and the 
area this would cover should be studied and risk matrix redrawn. 
Kirchsteiger(2006) of European Commission discussed various issues with regard 
to risk assessment such as including aging as a factor while evaluating risk. He concluded 
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that investigations showed that different failure rate behaviour among different Nuclear 
Power Plants was mostly due to better failure reporting than truly worse perfonnance. He 
mentioned the lack of international legislation which would make it mandatory to report 
hydrogen related incidents and accidents to a closed, partly open, or open user group. He 
has proposed the establishment of European Energy Risk Monitor (ERMON) which will 
consist of a web based infonnation system on energy risks, method on energy risk 
comparison and a network of European energy stakeholders. To minimize the risks to 
human health and environment resulting from the use of the different energy technologies 
(fossil, nuclear, renewable), study should be made to compare the risks among different 
energy systems. 
26 
Chapter 3: Failure Data Modelling 
Chapter 3 
FAILURE DATA MODELLING 
3.1 RELIABILITY MODELS 
There are several models which can describe a failure process. They are based upon 
the exponential, Weibull, normal, and lognormal probability functions. These are 
theoretical distributions and are mathematically derived. First the distribution which will 
suit the failure process has to be determined. A distribution that has a constant failure rate 
is called an exponential probability distribution. Failures due to completely random or 
chance events will follow this distribution. This model is present during the useful life of 
the system or component. Memorylessness is a characteristic of this distribution. This 
means that the time of failure of a component is not dependent on how long the 
component has been operating. There is no aging or wear out effect. The nonnal 
distribution has been used to model fatigue and wear out phenomena.(Ebeling, 1997). 
Before applying the normal distribution to model failures, the question whether failure 
times are normally distributed has to be answered. In thermal power plants any of the 
following factors, chemical, mechanical, electrical and environmental issues can cause a 
failure. As normal distribution is for modeling fatigue and wear out phenomena, it is not 
possible to state the failures in a thermal are normally distributed. Log nonnal 
distribution can be applied when the random variable T, the time to failure, has a log 
normal distribution. Thus the logarithm ofT has a normal distribution. The Weibull 
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failure distribution can be used to model increasing, constant, and decreasing failure 
rates. The advantage of Weibull failure data analysis is the ability to provide reasonably 
accurate failure analysis and failure forecasts with comparatively lesser samples. Another 
advantage ofWeibull failure data analysis is that it provides a simple and useful graphical 
plot, well accepted by academic and industrial practice. The main advantage of Weibul 
distribution is that it represents a family of distributions. 
The reliability model in this thesis is based upon Weibull distribution. However other 
models such as exponential, lognormal and normal are also described for reference. 
These models are described below. 
3.1.1 THE EXPONENTIAL RELIABILITY MODEL 
A failure distribution that has a constant failure rate is called an exponential 
probability distribution. Many systems exhibit constant failure rates. When all the failure 
modes of a component have constant failure rates the overall failure rate of the 
component is also constant. Failures due to completely random or chance events will 
follow this distribution. The reliability model represents the useful life of a component 
(Ebeling, 1997). 
3.1.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTANT FAILURE RATE MODEL 
Assuming the failure rate function, A.(t) =A., t ~ 0, 
The reliability function, P.(t) = exp [- jMt] = e", t;:: 0 
The cumulative distribution function, F(t) = I - e·'-t 
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(3.2) 
The probability density function, f(t) = - dR(t) = ')... e·At 
dt 
<tJ -.!t 1 
The mean time to failure MTTF = Je·A.t dt = _e- =-
o -A. A. 
The variance a 2 = j(t -.!.) 2 /..e ->.• dt = -1 
'A /..2 
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(3.3) 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
The standard deviation is (1/t..) =MTTF. This means that the variability of failure 
time increases as the reliability increases. The characteristics of exponential distribution 
are shown in the graphical expressions in figure 6.1, and figure 6.2 (Ebeling, 1997). 
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Figure 3.1: (a) The exponential cumulative distribution function. 
(b) The exponential probability function (Ebeling, 1997). 
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3.2: The exponential reliability function (Ebeling, 1997). 
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In the industry, the failure time vary very much. It should be noted that the mean 
time to failure is the reciprocal of failure rate. Though [ 1/A. (t)] is always in units of time 
it is the mean of the failure distribution for the constant failure rate model only. 
A second observation is that R (MTTF) = e· MTIF/MTIF = e·1 = 0.368 
A component having a constant failure rate has a one third chance of survival up its 
mean time to failure. The design life of a component having an exponentially distributed 
failure time may be obtained by solving for the inverse of the reliability function (Ebling, 
1997) 
TR=- .!.lnO.S= 0·69315 =0.69315MTTF 
...t A. 
The median is always less than the mean as the exponential distribution is skewed to the 
right. 
3.1.1.2 MEMORYLESSNESS 
A well-known characteristic of CPR model is its lack of memory. Other 
distributions do not have this characteristic. The failure of the component does not 
depend on its age. The failure can happen regardless of its age. This property is consistent 
with the completely random and independent nature of the failure process. When external 
forces cause a failure, the component's history is not relevant (Ebeling, 1997). 
This property can be demonstrated using conditional reliability 
t R(t + 'T' ) - e-.t(t+7i,) R(-)= .lo 
T0 R(T0 ) - e-.tt 
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e-.lt e-).Tn -AI 
=-- =e =R(t) e-A.r., (3.6) 
The burn in period To has no effect on the reliability. Time to failure depends only on the 
observed operating time (t) (Ebeling, 1997). 
3.1.1.3 FAILURE MODES WITH CFR MODEL 
When a system has n independent components which are connected in series and 
each having a constant failure rate then 
R(t) = exp [- !Adt] = exp[- At] 
1 1 Where MTTF = - = --
A f Ai 
i=l 
1 
n 1 L--
i=IMTTFi 
1 MTTF. =-
• A· I 
In other words, the system itself will have an exponential failure time. 
(3.9) 
(3.1 0) 
(3.11) 
If the components are also all identical (i.e., Ai = AI fori = 2, 3 ... n) then 
1 l = nAi> and MTTF = ~ (3.12) 
n 1\.J 
3.1.1.4 NUMBER OF SPARES DETERMINATION 
The Poisson distribution is often used to determine the number of spare components 
when the time between the failures is exponential. If S spare components are available to 
support a continuous operation over a time period, t, then (Ebeling, 1997) 
Rs(t) = ± Pn (t) where Rs is Component reliability for S spares) (3.25) 
n=O 
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Where P" ( t) is the Poisson mass probability mass function. 
p (t) = e->-•(A.t)" 
n n! n= 0, 1, 2 (3.26) 
3.1.2 WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION 
The Weibull distribution may be used to model constant, increasing and decreasing 
failure rates. It is characterized by a hazard rate function of the form 
(3.30) 
For mathematical convenience ).(t) is expressed as below 
( )Il-l A.(t) = ~ ~ B>O, fl>O, t ~ 0 (6.31) 
R{t)= .-(~J (3.32) 
~ ( t )Il-l ( t )p 
f(t) = e e e- e (3.33) 
Beta (~) is referred as the shape factor. Its effect on the distribution can be seen in 
Figure 3.3 (a) for several different values. For ~<1, the probability density function is 
similar in shape to that of the exponential and for large values of~ (e.g., ~=3), the PDF is 
somewhat symmetrical like the normal distribution. For 1 <~<3, the density function is 
skewed (Ebeling, 1997). 
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Figure 3.3: (a) The effect of~ on Weibull probability density function 
(b) The effect of B on Wei bull cumulative distribution function (Ebeline. 1997). 
When ~ = 1, A. (t) is a constant and the distribution is identical to the exponential 
with A.= (1/8). As seen in figure 6.3 {b) and 6.4 each of the cumulative distribution 
function and reliability curves passes through the same point where t = 0, since from Eq 
3.32, exp (-1) = 0.368. Therefore, 63.2% of all Weibull failures will occur by time t = 0 
regardless of the value of the shape parameter (Ebeling, 1997). 
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Figure 3.4: The effect of~ on the Wei bull reliability function (Ebeling, 1997) . 
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Figure 3.5: The effect of~ on the Weibull hazard rate curve (Ebeling, 1997) 
Figure 3.5 shows the hazard rate function can be increasing or decreasing depending the 
value of~ (Ebeling, 1997). 
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Theta (9) is a scale parameter that influences both the mean and the spread or 
dispersion of the distribution. The effect of 9 on the spread of the probability density 
function is shown in figure 6.6(a), for several different values. As 9 increases as shown 
figure the reliability increases at a given point in time In figure6.7 the slope of the hazard 
rate decreases as 9 increases. The hazard rate curve is linear in this example since P=2. 
The parameter 9 is also called the characteristic life and it has units identical to those of 
the failure time T (Ebeling, 1997). 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
Where, r(x) is the gamma function: 
(3.36) 
The values of f(x) can be found in standard Tables. With these tables, along with 
the fact that, for x>O, 
r{x) = {x -1 )r{x -1) (3.37) 
The mean and variance can be computed. Unlike the exponential distribution there 
is no direct relationship between the MTTF and A. (t). 
The value of the shape parameter p provides insight into the behavior of the failure 
process. Table 3.1 summarizes the behavior. Hazard rate functions that increase at an 
increasing rate reflect a very aggressive wear out phenomenon. The hazard rate curve in 
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Fig 3.5, for ~=4 is convex, and for ~=1.5, it is concave. Weibull provides a good model 
for much of the failure data found in practice, considering the variety of shapes and 
properties that are obtainable 
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Figure 3.6: (a) The effect of8 on the Weibull probability density function 
(b) The effect of8 on the Weibull reliability function (Ebeling, 1997) 
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3.1.2.1 FAILURE MODES WITH WEIBULL 
For a system comprised of n serially related components or having n independent failure 
modes, each having an independent Weibull failure distribution with shape parameter~ 
and scale parameter ei, the system failure rate function can be determined from 
(3.44) 
This reproductive property of the Weibull distribution is true only when each component 
has the same shape parameter. If the all failure modes are Weibull with differing shape 
parameters, then the system failure distribution will not be Weibull (Ebeling, 1997). 
3.1.3 THE NORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
The normal distribution has been used successfully to model fatigue and wear-out 
phenomena. It is also useful in analyzing lognormal probabilities. The density function of 
the normal distribution is shown in figure 3.8 (Ebeling, 1997). 
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-oo<t<oo (3.56) 
The parameters /-1 and cr2 are the mean and variance of the distribution respectively. The 
effect of a standard deviation is seen in figure 6.9 and on the normal hazard rate 
The reliability functionR(t) = j b exp[ 1 (1- ~)2 ]dt 
tv2rta 2 a 
(3.57) 
However, there is no closed form solution to this integral and it must be evaluated 
numerically. If the transformation 
T-ll 
z=-- (3.58) 
a 
is made then z will be normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of one . 
The PDF for z is given by 
"'( ) 1 -zi 
'l'z =--e 
-& (3.59) 
and z is referred to as the standardized normal variant. Its cumulative distribution 
function is 
ci>(z) = j cj>(z')iz' (3.60) 
Cumulative probabilities of any normally distributed random variable can be obtained 
from standard tables. 
Therefore in general, 
R (t) = 1 -ci>( t : ll) (3.61) 
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(t-J.l) F(t)=Cl> ~
The hazard rate function is 
;.(t) J(t) 
1- Cl>[(t - J.J )/a] 
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Figure 3.8: The effect ofthe standard deviation cr on the normal probability 
density function (Ebling, 1997) 
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3.1.4 LOG NORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
If the random variable T, the time to failure has a lognormal distribution, the 
logrithm ofT has a normal distribution. The density function for the lognonnal is 
f(t) = ~ exp[-~(ln-t ) 2] 
27tst 2s tmed 
t ~ 0 (3.64) 
where the parameter s is a shape parameter and tmcd , the location parametetr, is the 
median time to failure. The distribution is defined for only positive values oft and is 
therefore more appropriate than the nonnal as a failure distribution. Examples of the 
lognormal probability density function for different values of the shape parameter are 
provided in Fig 3.1 Oa. Like the Wei bull distribution, the log nom1al can take on a variety 
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of shapes. It is frequently the case that the data that fit a Weibull distribution will also fit 
a log nonnal distribution (Ebeling, 1997). 
The mean, variance, and mode of the lognormal are 
s2 
MTTF = t med exp( 2) 
cr
2 
= tmed 
2 
exp(s2 )[exp(s2)-1] 
t _ tmed mod -
c exp(s2 ) 
Since the logarithm is a monotonically increasing function 
F(t) = <l>(.!ln-t-J 
S tmcd 
Then R(t) = 1- <I>(.! ln-t-J 
S trned 
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Figure 3.10: The effect of the shape parameters 
(a) on the lognonnal probability density function 
(b) on the log nonnal cumulative distribution function tmed=l.O (Ebeling, 1997) 
Figure 3.10(b) is a graph of the CDF for different shape parameters for tmoo=l.O.The 
hazard rate for lognormal distribution can not be solved analytically. However the 
lognormal hazard rate can be calculated numerically selected points in time by finding 
f(t)/R (t) using equation 3.69. The hazard rate function increases until it reaches a peak 
and then it slowly decreases. This is an uncommon failure rate of many components. 
3.2 IDENTIFYING FAILURE DATA 
There are two general approaches to fitting reliability distributions to failure data. 
The first and usually preferred method is fitting the data to a theoretical distribution such 
as the exponential, Weibull, normal, or lognormal distributions. The second is to derive 
directly from the data an empirical reliability function or hazard rate function 
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3.3. EMPIRICAL METHODS 
Empirical methods of analysis are also referred to as non-parametric methods or 
distribution free methods. The objective is to derive directly from failure data (time), the 
failure distribution, reliability function and hazard rate function. A brief description is 
presented below. 
The parametric approach consisting of fitting a theoretical distribution is preferred. 
The empirical method is generally characterized by the collection of a large amount of 
data before much speculation as to their significance or without much idea of what to 
expect in contrast to with more theoretical methods in which the collection of data is 
guided largely by preliminary theoretical exploration of what to expect. The empirical 
method is only necessary in entering hitherto completely unexplored fields. The empirical 
method is information derived from the trials and errors of experience. The empirical 
methods become less empirical as the mastery of the field increases and gives way to 
theoretical methods. 
However there are occasions when no theoretical distribution adequately fits the 
data and only recourse is to apply the empirical analysis methodology. This empirical 
analysis is case specific and need only for every specific condition when no theoretical 
distribution adequately fits the data. When theoretical distributions do not adequately fit 
the data the empirical methodology is followed. Though this approach is not used in 
present thesis, a brief description is presented for information. 
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3.4 UNGROUPED COMPLETE DATA 
Given that, t1.t2 ...... tn where ti:Sti+t n ordered failure times comprised in a random 
sample the number of units surviving at time tt. is n-i. Therefore a possible estimate for 
the reliability function, R (t) is simply the fraction of units surviving at time ti. or 
n -1 i 
R(ti)=-=1--
n n 
(3.70) 
However Equation (6.70) implies that the estimate for cumulative failure distribution is 
(3.71) 
Therefore F (tn) = n/n =1 and there is zero probability of any units surviving beyond 
tn. Since, it is unlikely that any sample would include the longest survival time. Equation 
6.70 tends to underestimate the component reliability. It is also reasonable to expect the 
first and last observations on the average, to be the same distance from the 0 percent and 
100 percent observations, respectively. That is they are symmetrical with respect to the 0 
percent, 50 percent and 1 00 percent points (Ebeling, 1997). 
An improved estimate of the cumulative failure distribution is 
(3.72) 
Then R(t.) = 1--i-
• n+l 
(3.73) 
3.4.1 PLOTTING POSITIONS 
Equations (3.71) and (3.72) are only two of several possible estimates for F (t). 
These estimates are sometimes referred to as plotting positions since they provide the 
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ordinate values in plotting the cumulative distribution function. That is, the points (ti, F 
(ti)) provide a graph of the estimate ofF (t). These same ordinates are used in probability 
plots. 
Equation (3.72) provides the mean plotting position for the ith ordered failure. An 
alternative plotting position is based on the median. The median is often preferred 
because the distribution of F(ti) is skewed for values of i close to zero and close to n3• 
The median positions are functions of both i and n and they must be computed 
numerically. Tables are available to provide plotting positions for F(t) for selected 
i andn. The formula F(ti) = i- OJ (Ebeling, 1997) 
n+0.4 
F(ti)is often used as an approximation of the median position. 
(3.74) 
3.4.2 PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION AND HAZARD RATE FUNCTION 
An estimate of the probability density function may be obtained using Eq.(3.73) and 
the relationship between f(t) and R(t) given by 
for ti < t < ti+t (3.75) 
Therefore 
(3.76) 
An estimate of the mean time to failure is obtained directly from the sample mean 
MTTF = f!!. (3.77) 
i=t n 
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and an estimate of the variance of the failure disttibution may be obtained from the 
sample variance: 
n {t--MTTFt s= L ..:.....:...1 __ ___:.. 
· 1 n-1 1= 
(3.78) 
Equation (6.78) defines the sample variance and the square root of the variance is the 
standard deviation. 
3.5 GROUPED COMPLETE DATA 
Failure times have been place into time intervals, their original values no longer 
being retained, are referred to as grouped data. Since the individual observations are no 
longer available, let n,,n2 ...... nk be the number of units having survived at ordered times 
tt.t2 ...... tk respectively. Then a logical estimate for R(t) is 
i = 1,2 ... k (3.79) 
Where n is the number of units at risk at the start of the test. Because of the larger 
sample size of the grouped data it is generally unnecessary to obtain more precise 
estimates by considering plotting positions as before (Ebeling, 1997). Therefore 
f(t) = R(ti+t)- R(tJ 
ti+l- ti 
ni-ni+l 
(ti+l- ti)n 
for ti < t < ti+t 
for ti < t < ti+t 
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Where t· = ti + ti+l 
I 2 
3.6 FITTING THE DATA TO A THEORETICAL DISTRIBUTION 
(3.82) 
The process of fitting the data to a theoretical distribution can be done either 
through specially drawn graph papers or through probability plots obtained by analytical 
methods. The merits of each these procedures and the preferred methods are discussed 
below. 
3.7 PROBABILITY PLOTS AND LEAST SQUARES APPROACH 
Probability plots provide an informal method of evaluating the fit of data to a 
distribution. If the points (th F(ti)) i=l,2,,,,n on appropriate graph paper, are plotted, a fit 
to the distribution would graph an approximate straight line. This is because the vertical 
scale and possibly the horizontal scale have been modified to linearize the cumulative 
distribution function. Since straight lines are easily identifiable (Ebeling, 1997) a 
probability plot provides a better visual test of a distribution than comparison of a 
histogram with a probability density function. However, because of skewness, 
convenience of use and the ability to plot multiply censored data using rank adjustment 
method, approximation to the median plotting positions given by Equation (3.74) will be 
used. 
From a probability plot it may also be possible to obtain initial estimates for the 
parameters of distribution being fitted. Probability plots may also be used when the 
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sample size is too small to construct a meaningful histogram and may be used with 
incomplete data. 
There are two general methods of parameter estimation. They are least squares 
approach and maximum likelihood estimation. The former has been a popular choice and 
is tied to many familiar statistical concepts such as linear regression, sum of square's, 
proportion variance, and root mean squared deviation. Least squares approach unlike 
MLE requires no or minimal distributional assumptions and is useful in obtaining a 
descriptive measure for summarizing observed data.(In Jae Myung, 2003). MLE is a 
mathematics intense process which will be difficult to adopt in an industrial environment. 
Therefore, least squares approach is applied to data in this thesis. 
Least Squares Approach 
Field data is often accompanied by noise. Even though all control parameters 
(independent variables) remain constant, the resultant outcomes( dependent variables) 
vary. A process of quantitatively estimating the trend of the outcomes also known as 
regression or curve fitting therefore becomes necessary. The curve fitting process fits 
equations of approximating curves to the raw field data. Nevertheless, for a given set of 
data the fitting curves of a given type are generally not unique. Thus a curve with a 
minimal deviation from all data points is desired. The best fitting curve can be obtained 
by the method of least squares. The idea is to obtain a straight line with minimum error. 
Least squares approach provides such a straight line and hence least squares approach is 
more accurate than any other method. 
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At this juncture random error and residuals need to be discussed. A linear model 
is taken for discussion. Consider two variables 'x' and 'y' and check for the adequacy of 
the model 
y= a+bx+ e 
The variable 'e' denotes a random error. The relationship between x and y is 
linear. 
A model appears to be good when there are no errors. But field data always comes 
with error. The model can be said to be good if there is no connection between 'e' and a+ 
bx, that is the random error is free of 'x' . Hence for predicting y, this model contains all 
the information based on 'x'. Now there may be other variables which help in predicting 
'y'. These will be contained in 'e'. So the following assumption on a model should be 
verified. 
Model Assumption: The random error component is independent of the 'x' 
component.To check this assumption plot random error 'e' against a + bx. A scatter 
would indicate that the errors do not depend on a + bx; the errors are free of a + bx. Thus 
the model is good. At this point the errors are not known. As 'x' and 'y' are known 'a' 
and 'b' are estimated. Hence a + bx is known, leading to the predicted value of 'y' which 
is labelled as 'Y'. 
The estimate of the error is y- y. This is called the residual and denoted by 'e' 
The assumption can be verified by plotting 'e' against 'Y'. This is the residual plot. A 
random scatter indicates that the model is good. 
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The Least squares method is a mathematical optimization technique which, when 
given a series of measured uata, attempts to find a function which closely approximates 
the data (a "best fit"). It attempts to minimize the sum of the squares of the ordinate 
differences (called residuals) between points generated by the function and corresponding 
points in the data. An implicit requirement for the least squares method to work is that 
etTors in each measurement be randomly distributed. According to Gauss-Markov 
theorem,Myers,2001) least square estimators are unbiased and that the sample data do not 
have to comply with, a normal distribution. This is quite significant that the industrial 
data do not always follow normal distribution and least squares approach is a useful tool 
to analyse the data. The least squares technique is commonly used in curve fitting. 
Suppose that the data set consists of the points (xi. Yi) with i= 1 ,2,3 ..... n, a function f is 
required such that f(xi) :::::yi. Assuming that f(xi) = mx +c. The values ofm and x are not 
yet known. The values that will minimize the sum of the squares of the residuals need to 
be found out 
n 2 
S= ·~Jyi - f(xi)) This explains the term least squares. 
i=l 
The primary approach to probability plots is to fit a linear regression (least squares) 
line of the form y = a + bx to a set of transformed data. The nature of the transform will 
depend on the distribution. If the failure times fit the assumed distribution, the 
transformed data will graph as a straight line and the fitted regression line will have a 
high index of fit r. This approach is more accurate than manually plotting the data on 
51 
Chapter 3: Failure Data Modelling 
special graph paper. The least-squares fits to the exponential, Weibull nonnal and 
lognonnal distributions are discussed below. 
3.8 EXPONENTIAL PLOTS 
The cumulative distribution function for the exponential distribution is F( t) = 1- e-At or 
1 - F( t) = e-At 
Taking natural log on both sides 
ln[l- F(t)] =-At 
-ln[l- F(t )] = ln[ 1_ ~(t )] = A.t (3.83) 
Given failure times t~,t2 ...... tk, the points (ti. F(ti)) where F(ti) may be any of the plotting 
positions, may be plotted on exponential graph paper. The vertical scale is based on the 
transformation. 
Since F (MTTF) = 1- e-1= 0.632, the MTTF of the distribution may be estimated directly 
from the graph by finding the value oft that corresponds to F(t)=0.632. A more accurate 
fit to the data may be obtained by performing a least square fit of equation (6.83) using 
(3.84) 
Where, Yi = ln[I/[1- F(t,)] and Xi=ti this equation is used. The slope is b and the MTTF is 
1/b. 
52 
Chapter 3: Failure Data Modelling 
3.9 WEIBULL PLOTS 
From the Weibull cumulative distribution function 
( t )'' F(t) = 1- e- 9 
Applying logarithms again, 
lntn[ l-~(t)] =Pint -PinS (3.85) 
Therefore plot (x, y) will be 
Linear regression (least squares approach) line is of the form y = a + bx 
From the least squares fit fJ =b. 
The shape parameter () is obtained by setting 9 = J -Pa). Or using Weibull probability plot 
3.10 WEIBULL GRAPHING 
A least squares fit to the data is recommended over a manual plot of the data on 
probability paper. It is more accurate and less subjective than fitting by a straight line to 
the data by eye. In addition measures of how well the curve fits the data , such as the 
index of fit are available. However, a description of the Weibull paper is provided for 
information. Weibull graph paper is constructed so that data generated from a Weibull 
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distribution will graph as a straight line. The abscissa is a logarithmic scale, and the 
ordinate, while labeled in terms of the cumulative percentage of failures, F (t) is scaled on 
the basis of 
Theta, 8, can be estimated from the point on the line that corresponds to 63.2 
percent of the failures, since F(S )= 0.63.2. The 63.2 percent line is often identified on the 
graph paper. It can be seen from Eq.(3.85) that ~can be estimated from the slope of the 
plotted line. Weibull graph papers are published in different versions and hence care must 
be taken while finding the slope. The units of abscissa and ordinate may not be the same. 
The characteristic life 8 is found where the fitted line intercepts the 63.2 cumulative 
percentage lines 
3.11 NORMAL PLOTS 
For the normal distribution, 
F(t) = <~>( t ~p) = <I>(z) 
The inverse of the function can be written as 
(3.86) 
Which is linear in t . With the appropriate transformation of the vertical scale the points 
(ti, F (ti)) may be plotted. A least squares fit is obtained by setting 
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The values of Zi may be obtained from standard tables on the basis of corresponding 
value for F(ti). From the least squares fit and Equation (3.86), 
1 a 
u = b , J.l = -a and a = - b 
3.12 LOGNORMAL PLOTS 
Lognormal probability plots are based on the relationship of the lognormal distribution to 
the normal distribution. Since 
F(t)=<I>(~ln-t J=<I>(z) 
fmed 
and the points (In ti ,zi) are plotted or on lognormal probability paper, the points (th F 
(ti))are plotted. For a least squares fit, Xi=ln ti and yi=Zi. The shape parameter s, is the 
reciprocal of the slope of the fitted line and tmed, the median, is obtained from the y 
intercept of the fitted line. That is, 
1 
s = b and tmed = e-sa 
The various steps in failure modeling are shown in Fig 3:11 
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Calculate 
LNLN(l/1-F(ti)) for 
.--------1 ... ~ each failure data in 
the spreadsheet 
Draw plot with LNti 
in the 'x' axis and 
LNLN(l/1-F(ti)) in 
the 'y' axis and 
obtain the equation 
for the straight line. 
The slope of the 
straight line is the 
shape factor in the 
W eibull distribution 
Calculate 
characteristic life from 
the intercept of the 
straight line. 
Substitute these two 
constants in W eibull 
f(t) to calculate 
comoonent reliabilitv . 
Figure 3.11: Steps in Failure Data modeling 
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Chapter 4 
SYSTEM DEFINITION 
System definition is the first step in identifying the components to be inspected. 
Systems are defined based on the functions they perform. The boundaries of the systems 
are based on criteria specific to particular needs (i.e. safety aspects, operational 
requirements, process interactions, jurisdictional constraints, available data, etc.). In the 
case of fossil plants, the criteria are operational requirement and safety. 
4.1 BOILER SYSTEM 
Steam generators or boilers are a central element in today's modem thermal power 
station. They convert the energy in the fuel to a useful form - steam. The generated steam 
turns turbine - generator sets to produce electric power. Their primary objective is to 
provide the desired steam flow rate at specified temperature and pressure as efficiently 
and as cost effectively as possible from the fuel supply. Boilers are made of pressure 
parts (tubes, headers and cylindrical vessels) which separate the products of combustion 
(flue gas) from the water while permitting heat transfer to generate steam. This creates 
two separate flow paths or circuits: the air and gas circuit and the steam water circuit. 
Two basic designs are used for boiler: the firetube boiler and the water tube boiler. In the 
fire tube boiler, the hot gases pass through the tubes which are immersed in a cylindrical 
vessel containing the water. In the watertube boiler, the water and steam flow through the 
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tubes with hot gases passing outside. Cost, size and technical factors tend to limit firetube 
boilers to smaller low pressure industrial applications while watertube boilers supply the 
majority of steam used in medium and high pressure applications such as thermal power 
stations. As a result, water tube boilers are the central focus of this chapter. 
4.1.1 COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTEM 
The components of the boiler system are water wall tubes, superheater tubes, 
reheater tubes and economiser tubes. These components are linked in series and failure of 
one component will shut down the boiler as shown in Figure 4.1. 
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A cross section of a water tube power boiler is shown in Figure 4.2 The boiler 
consists of water wall tubes, superheater tubes, reheater tubes and economizer tubes.The 
large utility boiler is the waterwall type. A waterwall boiler is basically a box whose 
walls are made up of tubes through which water flows. The fuel is burned in the 'box' or 
furnace as it is commonly called. Heat is transferred to the water that flows through the 
tubes, and thus steam is generated. The flow of water through the tubes is important not 
only to generate steam but also to keep the tubes cool enough so that they do not become 
overheated and fail. Some provision must be made for this flow. In most boilers water 
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circulates from a drum at the top of the boiler, through pipes called downcomers to the 
bottom of the boiler and then up through the waterwall tubes to the drum again. Figure 
4.3 shows waterwall tubes on the furnace walls. 
DRUM 
OOWNCOMER 
ECONOMIZER 
WINOBOX 
AIR PREHEATER 
FDFAN 
Figure 4.2: Cross Section of a Power Boiler(Combustion Engineering Inc) 
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Figure 4.3: Waterwall Tubes(Babcox & Wilcox) 
For many boilers the force of natural circulation due to convection provides enough 
circulation through waterwall tubes for both good heat transfer and adequate cooling of 
the tubes. Heat is transferred from burning fuel in the furnace to the water in the 
waterwall tubes. When the water is heated its density decreases and tends to rise in the 
tubes and flow towards the drum. When it becomes hot enough to reach saturation 
temperature, steam bubbles are formed that also rise towards the drum because they are 
so much less dense than the water around them. As the heated water and steam rise in the 
waterwall tubes cooler water is drawn into the bottom of the bottom of the tubes from the 
downcomers, which draw water from the boiler drum. The rate of circulation is much 
greater than the rate of steam generation in boiler of this type. The ratio of number of 
pounds of water circulated to the number of pounds of steam generated may be as high as 
8 or 10 to 1. 
The rate of circulation due to convection depends on the difference in density between 
the heated water and steam mixture in the waterwall tubes and the water in the 
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downcomers. The density can be affected by two parameters. One is the height of the 
boiler. The greater the height of the boiler, greater the difference in pressure.(pressure at 
the bottom is higher due to the static head). And thus the density between the bottom and 
top of the boiler. This is one reason boilers are so high, often as 150 to 200 feet. The 
second parameter is boiler operating pressure. If the pressure in the boiler increases to 
what is known as the critical pressure 3206 psia, there is no difference in density between 
steam and water, so there can be no natural circulation. The operating pressure need not 
be increased to the critical pressure before the point is reached where natural circulation 
no longer provides adequate flow through the waterwalls. Boilers with pressures as low 
as 1800 psia may have inadequate natural circulation. Forced circulation is almost always 
necessary when operating pressure reaches 2600 psia. When natural circulation becomes 
inadequate, a boiler must use forced circulation. This arrangement uses pumps, usually 
located in the downcomer piping, to aid in circulation, which pennits higher operating 
pressures and better control of operation. 
The steam in the drum of a drum type boiler is at saturated conditions. If the 
operating pressure of the boiler is 2600 psi a, the temperature is 669° F. Modem power 
plants use temperatures of 950° F to 1050° F routinely to increase efficiency. Thus it is 
necessary to add more heat to the steam after it exits the drum before it is piped to the 
turbine. A special section of the boiler called superheater is used to raise the steam 
temperature. 
The efficiency of the power plant may be increased by reheating the steam after it 
has passed through part of the turbine. Special sections of the boiler called reheaters are 
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provided for this purpose. Figure 4.4 shows the entry of feed water to the economizer and 
then on to the steam drum, waterwalls in the furnace and back to the drum for eventual 
flow to the superheaters. 
Another special heat exchanger portion of the boiler is called the economizer. The 
economizer uses hot flue gas to heat the water that enters the boiler. This increases 
efficiency by recovering some of the heat in the flue gas. Also by transferring some heat 
over a lower temperature difference than in the furnace and in the waterwalls, the heat is 
transferred more efficiently. 
The heating of water and the production and super heating of steam have been 
discussed to this point without discussing the mechanism of heat transfer from the 
burning fuel. On the furnace side of the boiler, there are two types of heat transfer that 
predominate, radiation and convective heat transfer. This is because the fireball from 
burning fuel is so hot that a tremendous amount of radiant energy (infrared and other 
radiation) is generated. Radiation is proportional to the 41h power of the absolute 
temperature difference. 
Almost all the heat transferred to the waterwalls of the boiler is by radiation. After 
the fuel bums the flue gas that remains is still very hot but much less hot than the fireball, 
so there is negligible radiation. Heat is transferred from flue gas by convection to other 
tubes in the boiler. Usually the superheater and reheaters are in convection portion of 
steam generator and the economizer is always in this section. 
Heat transfer in the boiler waterwall tubes is also very important. It is complicated 
by the fact that it occurs as water changes phase to steam. The transformation from water 
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to steam can occur in two distinct ways, nucleate boiling and film boiling. In nucleate 
boiling steam bubbles grow on the inside of the tube walls and are swept away from the 
wall by the water. 
In film boiling, a thin film of superheated steam covers the inside diameter of the 
tube either because the water flow through the tube is not great enough, the tube becomes 
too hot or a combination of the two (the tube may become too hot because the flow is too 
low). The heat transfer through the film of steam is much less than that through water. 
This means that when film boiling occurs, the tubes are likely to overheat. This point of 
transition from nucleate to film boiling is called departure from nucleate boiling often 
abbreviated as DNB. It is important in steam generator design and operation to limit heat 
release in the furnace and to provide enough flow so that the point of DNB is never 
reached. IfDNB occurs, serious damage to the tubes will occur due to overheating. 
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Figure 4.4: Flow Path for Production ofSteam(Combustion Engineering Inc) 
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The efficient combustion of fuel and transfer of heat in the boiler requires that 
adequate combustion air be provided and that flue gas be removed from the area of 
combustion. Figure 4.5 shows the flow path of flue gas in a typical boiler. 
DRUM 
DOWNCOMER 
PRIMARY 
SUPERHEATER 
ECONOMIZER 
AIR PREHEATER 
Figure 4.5 Flow Path of flue gas(Combustion Engineering Inc) 
66 
Chapter 4: System Definition 
In some small or old boilers this is accomplished solely by natural convection or as 
it is commonly known natural draft. The hot flue gas rises through the stack and draws in 
cool air for combustion. 
As the boilers become larger, however, natural draft becomes inadequate and it 
becomes necessary to add a fan to blow enough air for combustion into the furnace. If the 
fan is big enough it will pressurize the boiler furnace and aid in the removal of flue gas 
also. Such a fan is called Forced Draft Fan. Boiler with only FD Fans are called 
pressurized furnace boilers because the boiler furnace pressure is above atmospheric 
pressure. This can be a problem because the flue gas, which is toxic due to the presence 
of heavy metals and corrosive and fly ash leak out of smallest openings in the furnace, 
causing maintenance and personnel safety problems. Also, some boilers with 
considerable convective heat transfer area need more than just a FD fan to move the flue 
gas. 
The solution to these problems is another fan that takes suction on the flue gas exit. 
Such a fan is called an induced draft fan (ID) fan. Boilers having both FD and ID fans 
operate at a slightly negative furnace pressure as the ID fans draw the flue gas from the 
furnace ( -0.05 in H20). In this way the problem of leaking flue gas and fly ash is 
eliminated. Such a boiler is called a balanced draft boiler. 
Another feature seen in most large utility boiler combustion air and flue gas systems 
is the combustion air heater. The flue gas that exits from the steam generator is 
commonly as hot as 600° F and represents a major loss of heat and source of inefficiency 
in the power plant. One way to reduce this inefficiency is to utilize a heat exchanger so 
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that flue gas can heat the combustion air. It is possible to reduce the temperature of the 
existing flue gas to 300° For less. Such a heater is called an air heater. Tubular air heaters 
or more commonly rotary air heaters called Ljungstrom after the inventor. The rotary air 
heater, described later in greater detail later is basically a large porous wheel that rotates 
from the flue gas duct where it is heated to the combustion air duct where it gives up heat 
to the air. The major components are described in the following paragraphs. 
4.1.1.1 WATER\VALLS 
The waterwall tube steam generator was described as a box with walls made up of 
water filled tubes. The construction of those walls is an important feature of the steam 
generator. A typical cross section ofwaterwall is shown below in Figure 4.6 
STIRRUP 
CHANNEL 
BUCKSTAY 
Figure 4.6:Standard Waterwall tube construction (Combustion Engineering Inc) 
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The above figure shows tubes joined by membrane which is a steel bar welded 
between adjacent tubes. This construction used in both natural and forced circulation 
units for all types of firing, has flat wall sections composed of panels of single rows of 
tubes on centres wider than a tube diameter and connected by means of a membrane bar 
securely welded to each tube on its centre line. This design results in a continuous wall of 
rugged, pressure tight construction. The individual panels are of a width and length 
suitable for economical manufacture and assembly, with bottom and top headers attached 
in the shop before shipment to for field assembly. Typical furnace wall using membrane 
construction is shown in Figure 4. 7. 
Figure 4.7: Boiler Furnace waterwall (Babcock) 
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These membrane walls are water cooled walls constructed of bare tubes joined 
together by thin membrane bars. The walls thus formed are gas tight and require no inner 
casing to contain the products of combustion. Insulation is provided on the outer side of 
the wall and metal lagging to protect the insulation. 
4.1.1.2 SUPERHEATERS AND REHEATERS 
Because the construction of reheaters is essentially the same as that of superheaters 
the following discussion also applies to reheaters. Except for some special applications, 
superheaters are located within the steam generator setting at a point where the gas 
temperatures are high enough to produce the desired steam temperature with a reasonable 
amount of tube surface and without excessive tube temperature. 
There are basically two types of superheaters, the convection type and the radiant 
type. Either of these superheaters can be further described by its orientation in the furnace 
or gas path and also by whether it is a primary or secondary superheater. Types of 
superheaters are described below. 
1. Radiant Superheaters - These superheaters are positioned above the boiler furnace 
at the front of the boiler and are the first superheaters that the gases contact. They receive 
most of their heat from radiation given off by the firewall. 
2. Convection Superheaters - These superheaters are located in the back pass of the 
boiler gas path, therefore receiving heat from the flow of hot gases over the tubes 
(convective heat transfer) 
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The orientations of superheaters are defined as follows: 
1. Pendent Superheaters - The tenn pendent describes a superheater that is hung or 
suspended in the gas path. The hot gases flow between the tubes in the tube bundle. 
Pendent superheaters are not drainable. 
2. Platen Superheaters - The tenn platen describes a radiant pendent superheater that 
is suspended through the furnace roof but miented parallel to the side walls of the 
furnace. 
These tenns apply to reheaters as well as to superheaters . Figure 4.8 shows a drum type 
steam generator with a radiant pendent type secondary superheater and a convection type 
primary superheater. Steam flows from the drum first to the primary and then to the 
secondary superheater. Figure 4.9 illustrates the flow of steam through the pendent 
reheater in the same boiler. 
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DOWN COMER 
Figure 4.8: Flow Path for Superheated Steam (Combustion Engineering Inc) 
Superheater and reheater design considerations are basically the same but reheaters 
are limited by steam pressure drop. The pressure drop in reheaters is critical because the 
gain in efficiency can be nullified by too great a pressure drop through the reheater 
system. 
On coal fired units the side-to-side spacing between the tubes is normally governed 
by the gas temperature and the fouling properties of the ash. On oil-fired units the tube 
spacing can be closer because the ash percentage is much less. 
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REHEATER 
INLET 
ECONOMIZER 
Figure 4.9:Flow paths for reheated steam (Combustion Engineering Inc) 
During start up, significant load swings and forced cooldowns, the superheaters and 
reheaters are subjected to thermal stresses. Consideration must be given to the forced 
cooling rates because maximum header stresses normally occur during forced cooldowns. 
The design of superheater and reheater tubes is normally based on creep rupture 
properties of the material. Increased temperature will lead to dramatic shortening of life 
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of a typical superheater element. In addition to the reduction in life due to creep rupture 
properties, intermittent operation above allowable design values will substantially 
increase thermal stresses and reduce life. 
The most important thing the operator can do to ensure satisfactory life of 
superheaters and reheaters is to limit the furnace exit gas temperature until steam flow is 
established through both the superheaters and reheater. This is done by adjusting the 
firing rate during start up of steam generator. Superheat operation at 1 00° F above the 
material temperature design value results in a tremendous reduction in superheater life. 
When choosing materials for superheater and reheater tubes designers must 
consider the oxidation resistance and economics involved in addition to the maximum 
allowable stress. The use of carbon steel should be extended as far these considerations 
permit. Because superheaters and reheaters are located in zones of relatively high gas 
temperatures, it is preferable to have the tubes themselves carry the major support loads. 
In horizontal superheaters the load is usually transferred to the boiler or wall tubes by 
means of lugs, one lug welded to the superheater tubes. In many cases these lugs are 
made of high chromium -nickel alloy. 
4.1.1.3 ECONOMIZERS 
The economizer stretches across the exit of the convection pass. It is essentially a 
counter flow heat exchanger. Figure 5.4 shows the location of the economizer. 
Economizers are normally equipped with vent and drain valves, a recirculation line and 
inlet stop check valves. 
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The vent and drain valves are used during filling and draining of the economizer. 
The economizer recirculation valve keeps the feedwater from boiling or steaming , the 
recirculation system is used during startup to ensure flow through the economizer. 
The inlet stop check valves prevent the feedwater from flowing in a reverse 
direction. For example, during shutdown and after the feedwater supply has been secured, 
the boiler is at a higher pressure than the feedwater system. The inlet stop check valve 
ensures that the economizer remains full of water. 
The economizer tubes can be plain, studded, or finned. Studs and fins help provide 
additional surface area to transmit heat from the flue gas to the feedwater but they can 
plug and restrict flue gas flow. Increasing the surface of the tubes on the gas side of the 
economizer is done because the coefficient for convective heat transfer is low for gases. 
To offset the low coefficient the area is increased. This makes it possible to use a smaller 
economizer. On coal-burning units, finned economizer tubes are not always used because 
the high ash content of the combustion gases leads to plugging. When fins are not used 
the size of the economizer has to be increased. The economizer tubes face a maximum 
temperature of 710° F and the heat transfer is 1 00% convection. At Holyrood Generating 
station there had been just one failure in 20 years. As heat transfer in the boiler envelope 
takes place through all the three modes of heat transfer, (conduction, convection and 
radiation), waterwall tubes are subjected to a temperature of about 1400 ° C and tubes of 
other components except economizer tubes, are likely to encounter temperatures around 
1200 ° F. The economizer tubes are at the tail end of the boiler heat stream and hence are 
subjected to about 660° F only and this temperature is below the recommended service 
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temperature of 850°F. The economizer tubes are carbon steel SA192. The maximum 
recommended service temperature for this steel is 850°F (French, 1990). There is no 
failure of economizer reported from 32 Turbine-Generator units, of capacity 100 to 
199MW, in the Generating Availability Data System maintained by North American 
Electric Reliability Council for the years from 1998 to 2002. As there is only one failure 
reported for economizer from Holyrood Generating Station in 20 years and with the 
absence of any economizer failure in the NERC - GADS report, the economizer is not 
considered for analysis in this thesis. 
4.2 BOILER AIR AND GAS SYSTEM 
The boiler and gas system provides combustion air and force the products of 
combustion through the boiler to the stack. This system consists of forced draft fan, steam 
coil air heater and rotary air heater. Though the largest equipment in the system is the 
rotary air heater and is also subjected to flue gas temperatures around 710° F , it does not 
fail often enough to cause production loss. The reason being that it rotates at a very low 
speed of about 3 RPM. Moreover, it consists fabricated plates and seals which are 
regularly replaced annually. The equipment of concern is the forced draft fan which 
handles large amount of air, rotating at 1500 RPM. It consists finely aligned components 
whose failure can bring the fan to fail and result in loss of production. Therefore, in this 
system forced draft fan is considered. The rotary air heater is a heavy equipment It is a 
regenerative air heater in which heat is transferred to elements rotating at 3 RPM, when 
they alternatively come into contact with furnace flue gas and air from forced draft fan. 
The rotary air heater is important for continuous production and is considered here. The 
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air and gas flow is shown in Figure 4.10 The description of the major components in this 
system are provided in the following paragraphs. 
Typical parameters of Air and Flue gas are given below: 
a. Air to FD Fan Temperature 95°F 
b. Air Heater Air inlet Temperature 116° F 
c. Air Heater Air Outlet Temperature 480°F 
d. Flue Gas Temperature entering Air Heater 675°F 
e. Flue Gas Temperature leaving Air Heater 500°F 
f. Furnace Pressure 30psi 
4.2.1 COMPONENTS IN THE SYSTEM 
a. 1500 HP, 132, 565 cfm Forced Draft Fans 2 units 
b. 21 Feet Circumference 5 HP, 3 RPM Rotary Air heaters 2 units 
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Figure 4.10: Air and Gas System 
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4.2.1.1 FORCED AND INDUCED DRAFT FANS 
As explained earlier, large modem steam generators require fans to provide 
adequate combustion air and to remove flue gas. All units use FD fans; balanced draft 
units use ID fans also. Nearly all units have two identical half capacity fans or sets of 
fans. Both FD and ID fans may be either centrifugal or axial flow. Centrifugal fans are 
the most common. Figure 4.11 shows a cutaway view of a typical FD fan. 
Figure 4.11: Typical Forced Draft Fan 
Most FD fan installations have dampers at the air inlet to control the flow of air. 
Normally, FD fans are constant speed, electric motor driven devices. Some units have 
two speed electric motors, and occasionally they are driven by variable speed steam 
turbines. Whether the system is balanced or pressurized the FD fan must supply the entire 
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airflow. As the FD fan in a pressurized system must produce a higher pressure than in the 
balanced draft system, the motor will be normally larger and more powerful even though 
the total airflow may be the same for both systems. 
ID fans are usually quite similar in appearance to FD fans. They may utilize either 
adjustable dampers or speed control to control the amount of flue gas through the fan. ID 
fans are normally larger than FD fans for any given system. These fans must be 
sufficiently sized to handle the required flue gas flow at maximum boiler firing rate plus 
any leakage of air past the seals of the rotary air heaters. This leakage is always from the 
air to the gas side of the air heater and acts to increase the total flow through the fan. 
ID fans are powered by either motors or occasionally turbines. Holyrood power plant 
does not have ID fans. 
4.2.1.2 ROTARY AIR HEATER 
The rotary air heater heats the air before admitting it to the furnace by using the hot 
gases leaving the steam generator. Combustion and efficiency improve with the use of an 
air heating system. The efficiency of the boiler will increase approximately 1% for every 
40°F decrease in exit gas temperature. An air heating system supplying air at 
temperatures of 300°F or more achieves a 5% to 10% fuel savings over a unit operating 
without heated air. The rotary air heater is shown in Figure 4.12 
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Figure 4.12: Rotary Air Heater( General Physics Corporation) 
Heating is usually achieved in two steps. First, the outside air travels through a 
steam or condensate coil preheater. Some preheaters use glycol, which is heated by steam 
to prevent condensate freezing inside the coil. Air preheating helps keep the cold end 
temperature of the air heater above the flue gas dew point. This is important especially 
when high sulfur fuels are used. If the temperature of the air heater falls below the 
dewpoint of the flue gas, there will be condensation of moisture on the air heater surface. 
This moisture will combine with sulfur dioxide and trioxide in the flue gas to form 
sulfuric acid which can quickly and severely damage the air heater. The air next goes to 
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the air heater. Some steam generators have no coil preheaters. For such units, fans often 
take their suction from inside the plant to help prevent chilling of the plant. 
Air heaters are classified as recuperative or regenerative. The recuperative air 
heaters are tubular. Tubular recuperative air heaters are basically straight tube and shell 
heat exchangers. The hot exit gas flows through the tubes and the combustion air flows 
over the tubes. Because of the size problems recuperative tubular air preheaters are not 
often used in modem power plant steam generators. 
The most frequently used air heater in power plants today is the regenerative, 
rotating type heater. In this design flue gas heats corrugated metal plates. The corrugated 
plates are layered and segmented to form a rotor. 
The housing surrounding the rotor is provided with duct connections at both ends 
and is sealed by radial and circumferential sealing members. This forms an air passage 
through one half of the air heater and a gas passage through the other half. The seals limit 
the leakage of air into the gas passage and the leakage of air out of the air passage. Figure 
5.8 illustrates a rotary air heater. 
Each air heater has tigh~ shutoff dampers on the combustion air outlet(hot air) duct 
and the flue gas inlet (hot gas) duct to allow maintenance and repair of the air heater. A 
lighted observation port is typically installed at the air inlet for inspecting the cold end 
elements during operation. To control the accumulation of soot and ash in the air heater 
elements the air heaters are installed with a cleaning system. The cleaning system 
includes steam soot blowers and water wash systems. 
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4.3 BOILER FEEDWATER SYSTEM 
The boiler feedwater system supplies feedwater to the boiler. This system consists 
of feedwater tank, boiler feed pumps, boiler feed pump recirculation valve and high 
pressure heaters. Of these components feedwater tank and high pressure heaters do not 
contribute to system failure. There has never been a failure of feed water tank at Holyrood 
Generating Station in 30 years. In the 2005 report of the North American Reliability 
Council(NERC) there is no mention of feed tank failure reported from any of the 1324 
Turbine Generator units in the years 2000 to 2004. The feed tank serves the purpose of a 
holding tank for the boiler feed pumps. It stores condensate obtained by condensing the 
exhaust steam of the low pressure turbine. The feed tank is not under any stress apart from 
the expansion caused by the temperature of the feed water. The tank is supported on 
sliding supports to allow for any thermal expansion. The oxygen in the condensate is 
stripped by injecting low pressure steam in the opposite direction of the condensate flow. 
Thus the feed tank is well protected against physical deformation due to thermal and 
chemical forces. The high pressure heater failure is a rare occurrence. Moreover, 
individual high pressure heaters can be bypassed if there is heater failure and the system 
will not have to be shut down. There will be a slight decrease in efficiency but the turbine 
will have more steam available to produce power, as there will be no extraction steam 
flowing to the failed heater. In the old units, the common cause of failure used to be 
stress corrosion cracking within 8 inches from the face of the tube sheet where the tube 
ends were expanded by mechanical rollers. If excessive pressure had been used during 
expansion the tube ends would have high residual stresses. If the feed water is dosed with 
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either excessive ammonia or phosphate stress corrosion cracking will take place near the 
tube ends depending on the tube material. Stainless steal inserts expanded by hydraulic 
expanders to measured torques at the tube ends, have mostly put an end to High Pressure 
Heater tube failures. Besides, the NERC report for the years 2000 to 2004 does not 
mention any high pressure heater failure in the 32 Turbine Generator units, of capacity 
100 to 199 MW, belonging to utilities using oil as primary fuel. Therefore, feed tank and 
high-pressure heater are not considered for analysis in this thesis. The boiler feed pump is 
3000 HP equipment pumping at a high pressure of about 2000 psi and also is a precision 
machine. Its failure is possible and can cause production loss. The boiler feed pump 
recirculation valve ensures minimum flow through the feed pump during low loads and 
hence has to reduce 2000 psi to 72 psi to pipe the feed water to feed tank. This valve is 
subjected to a large pressure differential and high temperature. There is a likelihood of 
failure of this valve and any failure of this valve can cause a loss in production. The 
feedwater flow drawing is shown in Figure 4.13. Therefore the boiler feed pump and the 
recirculation valve are considered. The major components in this system are described in 
the following paragraphs. 
Typical parameters of the system are as below: 
a. Feedwater Tank Pressure 
b. Feedwater Tank Temperature 
c. Feedwater leaving Boiler Feed Pump Pressure 
d. Feedwater leaving Boiler Feed Pump Temperature 
70 psi 
300°F 
2500 psi 
311°F 
e. Feed water leaving HP Feedwater Heater No.4 Temperature 350° F 
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f. Feed water leaving HP Feedwater Heater No.5 Temperature 390° F 
g. Feedwater leaving HP Feedwater Heater No. 6 Temperature 460° F 
4.3.1COMPONENTS IN THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM 
a. Boiler Feed Water Tank 
• Design Flow 1, 140, 000 Lb/hr 
• Operating Pressure 65 psi 
• Heater Section 6.5 ft diameter 
• Storage Section 12 ft diameter 
b. Boiler Feed Pump 
• H. p 3000 
• Quantity of Flow 1185 US gpm 
• Head 5600 ft 
c. Boiler Recirculation Valve 
d. High Pessure Heaters 
1. Number of Tubes 598 
ii. Diameter of tubes 5/8 inch 
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Figure 4.13: Boiler Feedwater System 
4.3.1.1 FEEDWATER TANK 
The feedwater tank holds the boiler feedwater. The feedwater tank receives the 
boiler feedwater as condensate from the turbine condenser. The condensate that enters the 
feed water tank needs to be stripped of oxygen and hence a deaerator is mounted on the 
feedwater tank. The feedwater tank is considered as a heat exchanger and is also called a 
deaerator. 
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Removal of dissolved gases in boiler feedwater is important because they are 
corrosive at the elevated temperatures in the boiler. This is particularly true of oxygen, 
but also of carbon dioxide and ammonia which is present in the boiler water due to 
chemical dosing of ammonia to maintain high pH. Thus deaerator does not only remove 
air but also corrosive gases. Open heaters whose effectiveness in oxygen removal 
approaches about 7 to 5 parts per billion are classed as deaerators. The feedwater exiting 
the deaerator supplies suction to the boiler feed pump, which then pumps it through one 
or more high pressure feedwater heaters to the boiler. Heating steam is supplied to the 
deaerator as to the other feedwater heaters from turbine extractions. A second source of 
heating steam is the high pressure feedwater heater drains. Generally the high pressure 
feedwater heater drains are cascaded downstream to the deaerator where due to the 
elevated temperature of the drains and comparatively low pressure in the deaerator, the 
water flashes to steam. Figure 4.14 illustrates the arrangement of deaerator and feedwater 
tank. 
87 
HIGH PRESSURE 
HEATER DRAIN--::;:I.f-iLJ 
DEAERATOR 
STORAGE TANK 
DEAERA'tOR 
DRAIN 
Chapter 4: System Definition 
EXTRACTION 
STEAM INLET 
Figure 4.14: Feedwater tank and deaerator(Chicago Heater Co) 
Deaerators can be used at a variety of pressures ranging from as high as 800 psi to 
below atmospheric pressure. Heat balance considerations in most plants however place 
the the deaerator at an operating pressure of 1 00 psi. As already noted the deaerator heats 
feedwater by mixing with steam. There are three mechanisms for accomplishing this 
mixing. The first is the spray. The water is sprayed in a fine mist into the area of the 
deaerator that contains steam. Dividing the water into tiny droplets increases the surface 
to volume ratio of the mass of water, facilitating better heat transfer. The second method 
is admitting steam to a volume of water. Bubbling the steam through the water also 
agitates the water, which helps to deaerate it. The third method of heating is cascading 
the water over trays. This causes the feedwater to form thin sheets from which gas 
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bubbles can easily escape. The deaerator must be vented to carry off non-condensable 
gases driven off the feedwater. 
Use of materials in deaerators is a serious consideration. The feedwater entering the 
deaerator is highly corrosive. The material in the area where steam and water are mixed 
must be corrosion resistant such as stainless steel or monel. Another consideration in use 
of the deaerator in a power plant is that most deaerators supply suction to the boiler 
feedpumps. The deaerator feedwater tank is generally placed as high in the plant as 
possible. This placement provides a water head that can be sufficient to satisfy the net 
positive suction head of the boiler feed pumps and can eliminate the need for booster 
pumps. 
4.3.1.2 BOILER FEED WATER PUMP 
The boiler feedpump is a centrifugal pump. The centrifugal pump is a simple 
machine that contains a rotating impeller within a casing. The centrifugal forces 
generated by the spinning impeller impart kinetic energy to the fluid. The centrifugal 
pump then converts kinetic energy into pressure at the discharge side of the pump. Large 
centrifugal pumps have two or more stages. 
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Figure 4.15: Boiler Feed water pump (General Physics) 
The discharge of the first stage is directed to the suction of the second and so forth. 
Multistage centrifugal pumps have wearing and casing rings for each impeller as well as 
interstage seals. Regardless of how many stages are used the construction and operation 
do not change. The major pumps in a power plant are all centrifugal pumps. The boiler 
feed pump is a multistage centrifugal pump. Figure 4.15 shows the cross section of a 
boiler feed pump. 
Generally, the most complex pump in the power plant is the boiler feed pump 
because of the severe operating requirements, the high total pump head that must be 
developed and the large capacities involved. Thrust in the boiler feed pump from the 
discharge to the suction is the result of differential pressure. This pressure is too great to 
be handled by thrust bearing alone. A balance disc is mounted on the pump shaft at the 
discharge end of the pump. High pressure water is allowed to leak to the rotating disc and 
keeps the shaft at fixed position due to the pressure exerted on the disc. The leaked water 
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is piped to the pump suction. This disc is nothing but a water lubricated thrust bearing. 
Normally the disc does not touch the stationary disc fixed to the casing. The disc can be 
damaged because of debris in the feedwater. Figure 4.16 shows a cross section of the 
balance disc arrangement. The mechanical seal at each end of the pump shaft is an area of 
concern. The mechanical seal can leak if the pump had not been properly warmed up 
prior to start up. The subject of boiler feed pump design is quite deep. Considerable 
research on boiler feed pump design in areas other than thrust balancing and seals are in 
progress. Much of the study of the hydrodynamics and stability of these pumps. 
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Figure 4.16: Boiler Feedwater pump balance disc arrangement (General Physics) 
Overall there has been more emphasis placed on the reliability of boiler feed pumps 
than on their efficiency. Part of the reason for this trend is that even large changes in feed 
pump efficiency have a relatively minor impact upon overall plant efficiency. This may 
be understood by examining two areas. 
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First the water or steam in the Rankine cycle experiences changes in enthalpy as it 
passes through the cycle. In some components, the change in enthalpy is large; in the 
neighbourhood of 1050 Btu/lb in the boiler, 360 Btu/lb in turbine, 1 OOOBtu/lb in the 
condenser and 40Btu/lb in each feedwater heater. The change in enthalpy across the feed 
pump is typically only about 1 OBtullb. Therefore the boiler feed pump has a relatively 
small influence on overall efficiency. 
Secondly the boiler feed pump is in the feed water heating cycle where the objective 
is to add heat to the feedwater. Pump inefficiency raises the temperature of the water 
because because of eddies and turbulence. However this heat is not lost to the cycle and 
so overall efficiency suffers very little. 
The reliability of the boiler feed pumps as with all pumps is affected by the design 
of the piping system in which it operates. The two factors having greatest influence on 
pump performance and reliability are the NPSH and the sizing of the required 
recirculation flow. This is intended to reduce the cost of the plant. In practice if the 
system is not designed with an adequate margin for these two parameters, damage to 
pump often results. For instance there should be 3% margin above the specified NPSH to 
ensure that there will be no cavitation. 
4.3.1.3 BOILER FEEDWATER PUMP RECIRCULATION VALVE 
All boiler feed pumps have recirculation systems. The recirculation system takes 
part of the pump's discharge capacity and returns it to the suction source. The purpose of 
the recirculation system takes part of the pump's discharge capacity and returns it to the 
suction source. The purpose of the recirculation system is to ensure a minimum flow 
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through the pump. A centrifugal pump continues to try to pump fluid even when the 
discharge valve is closed. The impeller spins the liquid and the discharge pressure rises to 
its maximum value. This condition is called shutoff head. In this situation, the pump 
generates heat quickly and some fluid must be recirculated to remove the excess heat and 
prevent the fluid from reaching saturation temperature in the pump resulting in 
cavitations. The boiler feed pump recirculation valve ensures minimum flow through the 
feed pump by diverting the high pressure pump discharge to the feedwater tank. The 
boiler feed pump recirculation valve has to reduce the pump discharge pressure of about 
2000 psi to that of the feed water tank pressure which is 100 psi. Hence the boiler feed 
pump recirculation valve is subjected to a verj high differential pressure across the valve 
plug. Therefore the plug called trim wears out quickly and the valve fails. A cross 
sectional view of the valve is shown in Figure 4.17 
93 
Chapter 4: System Definition 
Valve Body 
Valve Outlet 
Valve Trim 
Valve Seat 
Valve Plug 
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Figure 4.17: Boiler Feedwater pump recirculation valve (Masoneilen) 
The valve design is based on the principle of high resistance mutistep axial flow 
trim. In an axial flow trim, fluid flow is parallel to the axis of the plug and cage. Pressure 
reduction occurs along the length of the plug. Therefore no individual stage is ever 
exposed to full pressure differential. As a result trim life is greatly extended. 
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4.3.1.4 FEEDWATER HIGH PRESSURE HEATER 
Feed water heaters are designed to operate over a wide range of pressure and 
temperature. Heaters utilizing low pressure turbine extraction steam that are in the 
condensate part of the cycle might operate at a few hundred pounds on the tube side 
(water) and at less than atmospheric pressure on the shell (steam) side. At the opposite 
extreme, a heater utilizing extraction steam in the high pressure feed water portion of the 
cycle might have up to 4000 psig on the tube side and 1200 psig on the shell side. 
Essentially all feed water heaters consist of a cylindrical shell into which a tube 
bundle is inserted. The feed water heater may be mounted vertically or horizontally. A 
vertical arrangement has the advantage of small floor space requirements, however there 
must be adequate head room for installation of the heater initially and removal of the tube 
bundle for maintenance later. Low pressures feed water heaters are usually horizontal 
partly because it is difficult to design vertical heaters with separate drain coolers and 
desuperheating sections. However, many high pressure feed water heaters are vertical to 
facilitate removal of the necessarily heavy tube bundles. 
Figure 4.18 shows a horizontal shows a U tube horizontal feedwater heater 
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Figure 4.18: Horizontal U Tube Feed water Heater (General Physics) 
It is a counter flow heater with feed water entering at the bottom and exiting at the 
top, while the opposite is true of the heating steam. There is no desuperheating section or 
drain cooler. There is an impingement baffle at the steam inlet. This baffle helps 
distribute steam in the heater and protect the tubes from erosion from extraction steam. 
The feed water is routed to flow through the lower half of the heater by a partition plate in 
the waterbox . The feedwater exists at the top of the feedheater. The extraction steam is 
fed to the shell side of the heater from the turbine through a motor operated valve. The 
condensed drain flows out of the heater to either the feed water tank or condenser. 
The tube materials in the past were copper and brass alloys. Carbon and stainless 
steel are more common now because of the higher temperatures used in modem power 
plants. Current practice calls for use of 304 stainless steel, 90-10 Cu-Ni alloys or 
admirality brass in low pressure heaters. For high-pressure heaters, 70-30 Cu-Ni alloy 
and carbon steel are commonly used. 
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4.4 MAIN CONDENSATE SYSTEM 
The main condensate system condenses the exhaust steam from the low pressure 
turbine and pumps the condensate through low pressure heaters to the feed water tank. 
This system consists of condenser, condensate extraction pump and low pressure heaters. 
The condensate extraction pump is an axial flow pump pumping water at 90° F. This 
pump is not subjected any high stress and rarely fail. The low pressure heaters are shell 
and tube heaters and the heating medium is low pressure steam from the last stages of the 
low pressure turbine. The remedial measures taken for high pressure heaters were also 
employed for low pressure heaters. Hence they seldom fail. Moreover in the 2005 report 
of the North American Reliability Council (NERC) there is no mention of low pressure 
heater failure reported from any of the 1324 Turbine Generator units in the years 2000 to 
2004. The sea water flows through condenser tubes to condense the exhaust steam 
enveloping them. The condenser is under vacuum and the condenser rattles against their 
support plates during turbulence in the sea water flow, causing rupture at the point of 
contact. Therefore the condenser tubes have the potential to fail and result in loss of 
production. Hence, condenser tubes are considered for analysis. The condensate system 
flow drawing is shown Figure 4.19. The major components in the system are described in 
the following paragraphs . 
. Typical parameters of the system are as below: 
1. Condensate leaving condenser temperature 
2. Condensate leaving gland steam condenser Temperature 
3. Condensate leaving Low Pressure Heater No 4 Temperature 
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4. Condensate leaving Low Pressure Heater No 5 Temperature 
4.4.1 COMPONENTS IN THE CONDENSATE SYSTEM 
a. Condenser 
• Number of Tubes 7415 
• Tube Diameter 1 inch 
b. Condensate Extraction Pumps 2 Nos 
• H.P 350 
• Quantity of Flow 1770gpm 
• Head 550ft 
c. Low Pressure Heaters 2 Nos 
• Number of tubes 520 
• Diameter of Tube *inch 
• 
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Figure 4.19: Main Condensate System 
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4.4.1.1 CONDENSER 
Condensers in modern power plants are generally rather similar. They usually take 
the form of a large metal tank beneath the turbine. There are however, number of possible 
differences in the arrangement of the condenser. Although in most plants the condenser is 
located directly beneath the low pressure turbine. There are several variations in the 
shape, arrangement , flow paths, and flow directions. These variations are dictated by 
cost, space limitations, cooling water quality and availability, efficiency and other plant 
specific considerations. Variations in type include round, oval and rectangular shaped 
condensing space, single pass or double pass, circulating water flow through the tubes 
either parallel or perpendicular to the turbine shaft, and uniform or multipurpose 
condensing. Each of these has advantage in initial cost, case of erection or efficiency. 
Most modern plants have rectangular welded steel shell condensers. Where the supply of 
cooling water is plentiful, the condenser is generally single pass and uniform condensing. 
with the tubes perpendicular to the turbine shaft. Where the supply of water is limited, 
and cooling towers are used, condenser characteristics may include double pass 
circulating water flow, multipressure condensing and tubes parallel to the turbine shaft. 
Figure 4.20: shows the cross sectional view of a condenser 
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Figure 4.20 Cross section of a typical condenser (General Physics) 
The normal range of operating temperatures for the condenser shells is from 
ambient to approximately 120 ° F. Because of its large size and the fact that it may see 
temperatures as high as 212 ° F in low vacuum situations it has substantial amount of 
expansion. Therefore, the condenser shell is either supported on springs or rigidly 
supported with expansion joint at the top where it joins the low pressure turbine. Baffle 
plates are installed in the condenser to evenly distribute the steam exiting the turbine. 
Without these plates the top tubes would receive all the steam resulting in less than 
optimum cooling water utilization. Steam enters the condenser from the turbine generator 
low pressure exhaust. At this point steam has a high velocity. Some of the steam will 
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penetrate to the centre of the tube bundle and the moisture can erode the surface of the 
tubes and can cause tube leaks. The high velocity steam is desirable to strip off any 
insulating air blankets that may form on the tube surfaces. As steam condenses in the 
condenser non condensable gases trapped in the steam will come out of solution and 
accumulate. If these gases are allowed to accumulate in the condenser, the natural 
vacuum formed when steam condenses into water would be lost and the steam cycle 
would lose much of its efficiency. If the gases primarily oxygen and carbon dioxide are 
allowed to remain in the condenser, the condensate in the hotwell will absorb them, 
which will lead to corrosion in condensate and other systems. Air ejection and removal 
systems are installed to remove these non condensable gases. Air is removed from the 
condenser through air collection headers. These headers take suction in a section of the 
tube bundle that is physically separated from the rest of the tubes by baffle plates. These 
sections are called the air coolers . The air coolers reduce the volume of the non 
condensable gases and condense as much steam as possible. The air is then pumped out 
by air ejectors or vacuum pumps. The condensed water reaches the bottom of the 
condenser called hotwell. 
The most important element in the condenser is the tubes. The tubes carry the 
cooling circulating water in the inside and the outside provides the heat transfer surface 
which the steam is condensed. The capacity of a condenser is based on the heat transfer 
surface available. The greatest heat transfer surface would be provided by thousands of 
tubes. 
102 
Chapter 4: System Definition 
Many different materials have been used for condenser tubes: aluminium, admiralty 
brass (71% copper, 28% zinc and 1% tin), Muntz metal, arsenical copper, aluminium 
brass, aluminium bronze, 90-10 copper nickel, 70-30 copper nickel, stainless steel and 
titanium. The heat transfer coefficient for conductance and the initial cost. Aluminium 
may be the best material from the stand point of initial cost but actual costs are governed 
by such factors as resistance to corrosion and erosion on both the steam and circulating 
water sides, costs of installation and the actual effective heat transfer rate. The last factor 
is especially meaningful when one considers that the wall resistance to heat transfer may 
account for only 2% of the total. Steam side and water side fouling and film resistance 
may account for the remaining 98% of total resistance. Therefore materials that tend to 
resist this fouling and reduce the film resistance tend to have a much better overall heat 
transfer coefficient. 
Resistance to corrosion and erosion is also important because highly resistant 
materials will not require frequent replacement. Therefore material installation and 
operating downtime costs are saved. As a result of these considerations many modem 
condensers are being built or older condensers are retubed with stainless steel or titaniurr: 
tubes. 
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4.5SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the boiler, air and gas system, boiler feed water system and main 
condensate system are described. The specifications of the components, waterwall, 
superheater, reheater, forced draft fan, boiler feed pump, boiler feed pump recirculation 
valve and condenser tubes are provided to have an idea of the size of the components. 
The descriptions of low pressure heater and condensate extraction pump have been 
omitted as their failures are very rare and are not considered in this thesis. The failure 
data obtained for these components are provided for analysis in the forthcoming chapters. 
The failure data of other components in the systems are not provided as these components 
do not fail often enough to create loss of production and can be maintained during 
planned shutdowns. 
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Chapter 5 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Qualitative risk analysis is a screening technique based on plant specific or generic 
data and assumptions that are used to evaluate accident sequences, frequencies, and 
consequences. The objective of this part of the process is to identify and rank the 
importance of the equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe and efficient 
operation based on the availability of the plant systems and the impact of their failure 
during normal operation or on demand. In a qualitative risk assessment process, the most 
likely failure scenarios (root cause, failure mechanisms, failure modes, and 
consequences) are identified based on experience and engineering judgment. 
5.1 LISTING OF SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS 
The most important systems which have a large failure rate impacting production 
are considered. They are Boiler, Air and Gas system, Boiler Feedwater System and Main 
condensate system. 
5.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE CAUSES 
Studies of potential degradation mechanisms can help define potential component 
failure mechanisms and causes. Design and operational experience provides information 
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about component failure modes. This step can provide useful insight into identification 
and prediction of failures. 
5.3 FAILURE DATA 
The failure data can be obtained from the plant if the plant has kept a good data 
acquisition system. In case the plant data is not available, generic data can be used. 
Generic data can be obtained from North American Electric Reliability Council. The 
generic data consist of component failure caused by infant mortality, bad design, 
environmental problems or mal operation. Therefore, the data reflects the worst scenario 
and the plant failure may not have anything common with the generic data. Generic data 
may be used only when plant data are not available. The question of adopting generic 
data for this thesis did not arise as necessary data were available. The water wall failure 
data and others used in this thesis is plant specific (Holyrood Generating Station). 
5.4 WATERWALL 
The wall of the boiler furnace is made up of steel tubes. For typical 175 MW power 
boilers each wall has rows of tubes for a height of 1 00 feet. The material is SA 21 0 Gr 
AI. The diameter is 2 inches and thickness is 0.2 inch. There are 275 tubes on each wall. 
Failure of any one tube can cause boiler to be removed from service. The water wall 
tubes face direct furnace fireball. The temperature of the fireball is usually around 1400 ° 
C. The boiler water that flows through these tubes have a pH of about 9. Table 5.1 shows 
the failure modes of waterwall tubes 
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Table 5.1: Waterwall Tube Failure Modes 
Failure Mode Failure Mechanism Failure Cause 
Bulging Long term overheating Water formed deposits 
Large Fish mouth rupture. Short term overheating Pluggagc or flow related 
Rupture edges are thick. No problems 
deposits 
Distinct hemispherical or Caustic corrosion Availability of alkaline 
elliptical depressions filled with producing salts, mechanism 
corrosion products of concentration 
Rupture due to gouging Low pH corrosion Sea water ingress from leaky 
during service condenser tubes 
Metal loss on waterwall tubes Fire side corrosion Incomplete combustion, 
Insufficient Oxygen at burner 
zones 
Thick walled window opening Hydrogen damage Release of atomic hydrogen 
due to electrochemical 
corrosion reactions 
5.5 SUPERHEATER 
The saturated steam generated in the water walls is routed to be superheated in the 
Superheaters. The Superheater consists of many rows of tube panels, typically 26 rows 
for a 175 MW boiler. The tubes are of Stainless steel SA 213 TP 321 H. The size of the 
tubes is 2-inch outer diameter with a 0.2 inch thickness. The Superheaters are located 
close to the roof of the boiler furnace and see the flame. Therefore the heat transfer is 
mostly due to radiation. In case of multiple stages, superheating the superheaters are also 
located in the convection zones of the boiler. Superheater tube failure occurs mainly due 
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to aging creep, erosion, overheating due to soot, temperature excursions, incorrect 
chemical regime and wrong superheater tube material. 
5.6 REHEATER 
The function of the reheater is to superheat the temperature of the steam exhausted 
from the High Pressure Steam Turbine to that of the steam exiting the Superheater. The 
steam which is superheated in the reheater will enter the intermediate steam turbine. The 
purpose of reheating is to increase the efficiency of the cycle. The reheaters are located 
in the convection zones of the boiler. These are tube panels installed in rows. A typical 
reheater tube size is 2 inch with a thickness of 0.14 inch. The material is SA 213 TP. The 
reheater tubes can fail due to creep, improper chemical regime, and overheating and 
wrong tube material. The failure modes of Superheater and Reheater are tabulated in 
Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Superheater and Reheater Failure Modes 
FAILURE MODE FAILURE FAILURE CAUSE 
MECHANISM 
Rupture at bulge with Long term over Deposits, Improper firing, 
fragmented oxides outside heating Improper material, Creep 
Longitudinal tear, edges same Short term Brief upset operating 
as tube thickness overheating conditions 
Needle Wedge shaped cracks Corrosion Fatigue Cyclic Tensile stresses, low 
perpendicular to metal surface Cracking pH, High dissolved Oxygen 
Thick walled fractures with Stress Corrosion Presence of tensile strength 
branches Cracking and corrodants 
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5.7 ECONOMIZER 
The economizer failures are few. However the failure modes of economizers are 
tabulated in table 5.3, to show the existence of possibilities for failure. Under failure 
causes, presence of acid is mentioned for all failure modes. The acid comes from the flue 
gas when the flue gas temperature is lower than the acid dew point. Normally the plant 
will operate the boiler in such a fashion to avoid the flue gas cooling to the sulfur dew 
point temperature, which is specified for each type of fuel. 
Table 5.3: Economizer Failure Modes 
FAILURE MODE FAILURE FAILURE CAUSE 
MECHANISM 
Deep gouging filled with Low pH corrosion Availability of free acid or acid 
laminated iron oxide deposit producing salts and means of 
concentrating them 
Poke marked metal surface. Cold end corrosion Corrosive quantities of sufur 
Detachment of fins trioxide in flue gas in the 
presence of moisture 
Irregular pebble like surface. Dew point Presence of sulfurous ash on the 
Irregular contour corrosion while tube surface and low dew point 
shut down 
Thick walled fractures with Stress Corrosion Presence of tensile strength and 
branches Cracking corrodants 
5.8 FORCED DRAFT FAN 
The table shows the times when failure was observed in FD Fan. The FD Fan 
failure modes are tabulated in Table 5.4 
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Table 5.4: FD Fan Failure Modes 
FAILURE MODE FAILURE CAUSE 
Insufficient discharge Pressure Air leaks, 
damaged rotor, 
incorrect inlet vane positions, system head 
greater than design 
Overheated bearings Abnormal end thrust, 
Aerodynamic instability, Bent shaft, Loose 
bolts, Damaged wheels, Dirt in bearings, 
Damaged runner, Foreign substance on runner, 
Mis- alignment, Heat transmitted from outside, 
vibration transmitted from outside 
Short bearing life Aerodynamic instability, Bent shaft, Speed too 
high 
Overload on Motor Improper bearing lubrication, Bent shaft, Fan 
delivering more than rated capacity, Mis-
alignment, Total system head greater than 
design. 
High Vibration Abnormal end thrust, Aerodynamic instability, 
Improper bearing lubrication, Bent shaft, Loose 
bolts, Damaged runner, Dirt on runner, 
Resonance, Misalignment. 
110 
Chapter 5: Qualitative Analysis 
5.9 BOILER FEED PUMP 
The boiler feed pump failure modes are described in Table 5.5 
Table 5.5: Boiler Feed Pump Failure Modes 
FAILURE MODE FAILURE CAUSE 
Low discharge Pressure Cavitation, clogged impeller, air pockets, 
Insufficient suction pressure, total system 
head higher than design. 
Insufficient Capacity Cavitation, clogged impeller, air pockets, 
suction strainer, clogged, insufficient 
suction pressure, internal wear, leaks in 
pipes, vessels, non condensables in liquid 
High bearing temperature Bent shaft, cavitation, worn bearings, 
misalignment, wrong lubricant, Lube oil 
temperature high 
Short Mechanical seal life Bent shaft, pipe strain, cavitation, improper 
mechanical seal, insufficient warm up, 
misalignment 
High Vibration Bent shaft, pipe strain, clogged impeller, 
internal wear, misalignment, rotor 
imbalance, 
High Noise Levels Cavitation, air pockets, insufficient suction 
pressure, 
111 
Chapter 5: Qualitative Analysis 
5.10 BOILER FEEDWATER PUMP RECIRCULATION VALVE 
The Boiler Feed Pump Recirculation Valve times are as per. The failure mode of boiler 
feed pump recirculation valve is tabulated in Table 5.6 
Table.5.6: Boiler Feed Pump Recirculation Valve Failure Modes 
FAILURE MODE FAILURE CAUSE 
Leakage through valve Excessive wear, Line pressure too high, Mechanical 
damage to seat 
5.11 CONDENSER 
The failure modes are tabulated in Table 5.7 
Table 5.7: Condenser Failure Modes 
F AlLURE MODE F AlLURE CAUSES 
Tube thinning Random excitation, Air pockets 
Tube failure Improper tube material 
Low vacuum Unclean tubes, Air pockets 
5.12 ESTIMATION OF FAILURE PROBABILITIES 
As it is a qualitative analysis, the failure probabilities components will be ranked 
relative to each other. The probability categories are ' very low', 'low', 'medium', 'high,' 
and 'very high'. Word definitions and probabilities are as per table 5.8 (ASME 1991). 
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Table 5.8: Probability Definition 
Possible Definition Failure 
Qualitative Frequency 
Ranking 
Very High An event that can occur more than once in w·• 
a components lifetime. 
High An event that can occur once in a 10"" 
components lifetime 
Medium An event that is not expected to occur once 10-4 
in a component's lifetime but when 
integrated over all the system components 
has the credibility of occurring once 
Low An event of such low probability that an w-o 
event in this category is rarely expected to 
occur 
Very Low An event of such low probability that an w-~~ 
event in this category is considered to be 
incredible 
5.13 CONSEQUENCE ESTIMATION 
The consequence portion has two categories. One is safety and the other is 
economic consequence. Environmental consequences can be included in either of these 
categories. or addressed separately. Safety consequences both direct and indirect are not 
considered in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) evaluations from a structural integrity 
point of view. No generally accepted method exists for combining safety and economic 
consequences. The consequence of economic loss will have to be estimated, but 
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experience usually exists from other related failures that can be utilized for estimation. 
Economic loss includes the repair or replacement of the component that has failed, the 
repair or replacement of other equipment that was affected by the failure, the loss of 
availability of the overall system, business interruption and damage to the public or 
environment. The dollar values of economic consequences are tabulated in Table 5.9 
(ASME 1991 ). 
Table 5.9: Economic Consequence (ASME Risk Based Inspection Development of 
Guidelines, 1991) 
Possible Qualitative Definition Estimated 
Ranking Consequence 
Cost$ 
Very High Failure causes significant potential off- 10~ 
site and facility or system failure costs 
and potential for significant litigation. 
High Failure causes indefinite shutdowns, 1011 
I 
significant facility or system failure 
l costs and potential for litigation. 
Medium Failure causes extended unscheduled 10' 
loss of facility or system and significant 
component failure costs 
Low Repair can be deferred until a scheduled 10~ 
shutdown, some component failure costs 
will occur 
Very Low Insignificant effect on operation 10'1 
The safety consequences are not included in Table 5. 9 The safety consequences 
need to be assessed separately according to the Corporate Safety Guidelines. 
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5.14 QUALITATIVE RISK MATRIX 
When the likelihood and consequences of component failures have been 
determined, graphic methods can be used to organize and illustrate the effects of these 
two parameters on the system. A qualitative risk based ranking matrix has been adapted 
from similar approaches used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 1987) 
and by Lercari (Lercari 1987) for the state of California Office of Emergency Services. 
The matrix is arranged in such a fashion that probability increases in the vertical direction 
upwards and the consequence increases in the horizontal direction to the right. The matrix 
shows the highest priority items at the upper right hand corner. However, the matrix 
draws attention to items with least probability and unacceptable consequences as well as 
items with least consequences and unacceptable probabilities. The risk matrix for 
components discussed in this thesis drawn as per Figure.5.1 
Very High 
High 
Very Feed water heater 
Consequence severity 
Fig 5.1: Risk Matrix 
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The risk matrix is drawn in Figure 5.1 shows that the waterwall and superheater 
tubes have a high probability of failure with the consequential shut down and component 
expenditure. There is no reason for litigation arising out of this failure. The power 
guaranteed to the distribution company will be met by running Gas Turbines. There is no 
failure qualified to a high or very high consequential item in this thesis. A lube oil cooler 
failure in a Turbo Generator will be a high consequential item. A fuel oil tank rupture 
will be a very consequential item as such a failure can cause environmental damage 
resulting in possible litigation. The lubrication oil tank is located always close to the 
turbine and it is in a high traffic area and hence any problem will with the integrity of the 
tank will be noticed. Moreover the tank is not pressurized. In fact the vapour extractor of 
the tank keeps it under a vacuum of about seven centimeters of water. 
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Chapter 6 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
6.1 ANALYSIS OF FIELD DATA 
This chapter is about analyzing field data obtained from a thermal power plant. 
The data relate to failure times of waterwall tubes, superheater tubes, reheater tubes, 
forced draft fan, boiler feed water pump, boiler feed water pump recirculation valve, and 
condenser tubes. The strategy is to fit the data to a theoretical distribution. The 
preference to a theoretical distribution over an empirical distribution is discussed in 
chapter-3. The empirical methodology is not acceptable in an industrial set up where 
strict control is maintained over financial operations and major expenditures have to be 
justified to stake holders and the Public Utility Board and hence reasons for major 
expenditures have to be based on sound scientific principles. Therefore, the theoretical 
distribution that can fit the data with a regression coefficient according to figure 6.1. is 
selected. Least Squares approach is adopted and Microsoft Excel is used to draw the 
graphs and calculate the regression coefficient. 
6.1.1 WATERWALL 
The waterwalls are tubes that form the walls of the boiler furnace as explained in 
chapter-4. There had been seven failures. The failure times are in hours of operation. The 
first failure had occurred after 86,256 hours of operation of the boiler. There had been 
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seven failures. They are 86,256 hours, 98,4 72 hours, 98,640 hours, 101 ,016 hours, 
106,056 hours, 109,656 hours, and 111,816 hours. The data were fitted to Weibull 
distribution employing least squares approach. 
For the least squares approach x =In I; and y = lnln C _ ~(t)). 
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Figure 6.1: Regression Coefficient r and~ for goodness of fit (Abernathy, 2000) 
The shape factor p is 12 and the characteristic life 0 is 112,795. The regression 
coefficient is 0.95. Please refer to figure 6.1 as the failure data are fitted to Weibull 
distribution the regression coefficient of 0.95 for seven failures is a good fit. The 
following table and plot illustrate data fitting. 
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Table 6.1: Least squares fit of seven failure data ofwaterwall 
i Failure Times.t1 F(tl)=i-0.3/6+0.4 Ln(t1) LnLn(l/(1-F( t1))) 
1 86256 0.0945 11.3650 -2.3088 
2 98472 0.2297 11.4975 1.3431 
3 98640 0.3648 11.4992 0.7898 
4 101016 0.5 11.5230 0.3665 
5 106056 0.6351 11.5717 0.0081 
6 109656 0.7702 11.6051 0.3858 
7 111816 0.9054 11.6246 0.8578 
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Figure 6.2 :Weibullleast squares plot ofwaterwall failure data 
The equation for the Weibullleast squares plot is 
y= 12x + (-139.76) 
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Intercept a= -139.76; Slope= p = 12 
e=J·~O) 
Substituting, e = 112795 
R(t)=e·(tt 
Running Hours per year= 7416 
Substituting, Reliability R (t) = 0.98 
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Referring to equation (6.34), Mean Time to Failure= er( I+~) 
Substituting, MTTF =112795r (1 + 0.083) or 108252 hours. 
6.1.1.1 SUMMARY OF WATERWALL FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS 
The shape factor p is 12. The characteristic life 9 is 112795. The mean time to 
failure is 108252 hours. The reliability for an operation of 8760 hour per year is 1. The 
reliability for a five-year operation is 0.99. But the last failures had shown hydrogen 
damage to the tubes indicating a potential increase in tube failures. 
6.1.2 SUPERHEATER 
The superheaters raise the temperature of saturated steam to super heated. The 
locations of the superheaters and the various types have been described in chapter-4. The 
following table 6.2 illustrates the failure data analysis as per least squares approach. The 
regression coefficient is 0.87 and it is acceptable as a regression coefficient of 0.83 for a 
six failure will provide a good fit for considering Weibull distribution, according to the 
chart in Figure 6.1 
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Table 6.2: Least squares fit of six failure data of superheater 
i Failure Times.t1 F(tl)=i-0.3/6+0.4 Ln(t1) LnLn(l/(1-F(tl))) 
1 39572 0.1093 10.5858 2.1556 
2 57672 0.2656 10.96252 1.1752 
3 57792 0.4218 10.96460 0.6015 
4 58392 0.5781 10.9749 0.1472 
5 71520 0.7343 11.1777 0.2819 
6 71616 0.8906 11.1790 0.7943 
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Figure 6.3: Weibullleast squares plot of superheater failure data 
The equation for the Weibullleast squares plot is 
y = 4.5915x x (-50.888) 
Intercept a= -50.888; Slope= ~ = 4.5915 
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e = 65026.67314 
Running Hours per year= 8760 
Reliability= 0.99 
MTIF = 65026 f ( 1 + 0.217) = 59536 hours. 
6.1.2.1 SUMMARY OF SUPERHEATER FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS 
The analysis has revealed that the superheater failure data follow Weibull 
distribution. The shape parameter ~ is 4.59 and the characteristic life 8=65026 hours. The 
mean time to failure MTTF is 59536 hours. The reliability for an annual running hour of 
8760 hours is 0.99. 
6.1.3 REHEATER 
The reheater tubes are placed in the convection heat zone in the boiler. The 
occurrence of tube failure is not frequent. There can be only two reasons for frequent 
reheater tube failures. One is improper reheater metal . A 2.25% chromium tube being in 
use where a 9% chromium tube is required due to higher heat flux. Secondly, during 
boiler start ups the reheater tubes will not have any steam flowing through their tubes due 
to the turbine being not in service. Turbine is required to be in service as reheater gets its 
steam from the exhaust of high pressure turbine. Till steam is admitted to turbine, and 
flow established through the reheater, the boiler firing rate needs to be kept low so as not 
to allow the furnace exit gas to exceed 800°F. When firing rate exceeds this limitation, 
reheater tubes which are located in the convection pass fail. During every annual outage 
it is usual to see reheater tubes warped and out of alignment. In this case plants replace 
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sections of the reheater where warping has taken place. The fact that there are only three 
failures does not mean that the tubes in the reheater are reliable. The three failure data 
were fitted for Weibull, and yielded a regression coefficient of 0.83 whereas the 
regression coefficient obtained from exponential distribution was only 0.62. In as much 
as an acceptable regression coefficient is set at 0.75, Weibull distribution is acceptable 
for analyzing the reheater failure data. The following table 6.3 illustrates the failure data 
analysis. 
Table 6.3: Least squares fit of three failure data ofreheater 
i Failure Times.t1 F( tl)=i-0.3/3+0.4 Ln(t1) LnLn(l/(1-F(tl))) 
I 32256 0.2058 10.3814 1.4674 
2 88152 0.5 11.3868 0.3665 
3 90768 0.7941 11.4160 0.4577 
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Figure 6.4: Weibull plot of three failure data ofreheater 
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The equation for the Weibullleast squares plot is 
y = 1.4998x x (-17.049) 
Intercept a= -17.049; and Slope= p = 1.4998 
e = s3561.09612 
Running hours per year= 8760 
Reliability = 0.96 
MTTF = 83561 r (1 + 0.66) or 75204 hours. 
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6.1.3.1 SUMMARY OF REHEATER FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS 
The failure data analysis yielded a -?value of 0.836 for three failures. This implies 
that 83.6% of the variation in data is explained by the fit of the trend line. The acceptable 
r
2 
value for good fit for a three failure Weibull analysis is 0.774 according to the chart in 
Fig 6.1. The shape factor P is 1.5 and the characteristic life (} is 83 561 hours. The mean 
time to failure MTTF is 75204 hours. The reliability for annual running hours is 0.966. 
6.2 FORCED DRAFT FAN 
The forced draft fans blow air for combustion in the furnace. They are huge 
fabricated equipment running at 1800 rpm. The fan blades develop cracks during service 
and cause vibration. The lubrication oil system and fan controls cause fan failures too. 
There are eight failure data are analyzed in this chapter. Table 6.4 illustrates the data 
analysis. 
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Table 6.4: Least Squares fit of eight failure data of Force Draft fan 
i Failure Times.t1 F( tl)=i-0.3/3+0.4 Ln(t1) LnLn(l/(l-F(t1))) 
1 26760 0.0833 10.1946 -2.4417 
2 32160 0.2023 10.3784 -1.4866 
3 32352 0.3214 10.3844 -0.9473 
4 42720 0.4404 10.6624 -0.5435 
5 65712 0.5595 11.0930 -0.1985 
6 65736 0.6785 11.0934 0.1266 
7 88608 0.7976 11.3919 0.4685 
8 96168 0.9166 11.4738 0.9102 
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Figure 6.5: Weibull plot of Force Draft fan 
The equation for the Weibull least squares plot is 
y=2.1x x (-23.3) 
Intercept a= -23.3; and Slope ~ = 2.1 
125 
Chapter 6: Quantitative Analysis 
8 = 65856 hours 
Running Hours per year= 8760 
Reliability= 0.98 
MTTF = 65856 r (1 + 0.476) or 61246 hours. 
6.2.1 SUMMARY OF FORCED DRAFT FAN FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the FD Fan failure data analysis yielded r2 value of 0.9, which is 
acceptable for eight failures. The acceptable r2value for good fit for a eight failure 
Weibull analysis is 0.85 according to the chart in figure 6.1. The shape factor p is 2.1 
and the characteristic life B is 65,856 hours. The mean time to failure MTTF is 61,246 
hours. The reliability for annual running hours is 0.98 
6.3 BOILER FEED PUMP 
The boiler feed pump provides the feed water to the boiler. Five failures are 
analyzed. Table 6.5 illustrates the analysis of the failure data by least squares approach. 
Table 6.5: Least squares fit of five failure data of Boiler feed pump 
i Failure Times.t1 F( tl}=i-0.3/3+0.4 Ln(t1) LnLn(l/(1-F(tl))) 
1 116208 0.1296 11.6631 -1.9744 
2 142296 0.3148 11.8656 -0.9726 
3 142632 0.5 11.8680 -0.3665 
4 142680 0.6851 11.8683 0.1447 
5 167208 0.8703 12.0269 0.7144 
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Figure 6.6: Wei bull plot of Boiler feed pump 
The equation for the Weibullleast squares plot is 
y=7.43x x (-88.71) 
Intercept a= -88.71; and Slopep = 7.43 
e = 150892 hours 
Running Hours per year= 8760 
Reliability = 1 
MTTF = 150892 r (1 + 0.1345) = 131276hours. 
6.3.1 SUMMARY OF BOILER FEED PUMP FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the boiler feed pump failure data analysis yielded r value of 0.85 
which is acceptable for five failures. The acceptable rvalue for a good fit for five failure 
Weibull analysis is 0.81 according the chart in Figure 6.11. The shape factor p is 7.43 
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and the characteristic life B is 150892 hours. The mean time to failure MTTF is 131276 
hours. The reliability for an annual running hour is 1 for a year 
6.4 BOILER FEEDPUMP RECIRCULATION VALVE 
The boiler feed pump recirculation valve has to reduce the high boiler feed pump 
pressure of about 2000 psi to about 75 psi and in this process its seat and plug undergo a 
high differential pressure and the valve slowly begins to deteriorate and eventually fail. 
Technological advances in the design have steadily improved the performance of these 
valves. However they do breakdown. Table 6.6 illustrates the analysis of 5 Boiler feed 
pump recirculation valve failure data. 
Table 6.6: Least squares fit of five failure data of Boiler Feed pump recirculation valve 
i Failure Times.t1 F(tl)=i-0.3/5+0.4 Ln(t1) LnLn(l/(1-F(ti))) 
1 27072 0.1796 10.2062 -1.6194 
2 54840 0.3648 10.9121 -0.7900 
3 61608 0.55 11.0285 -0.2250 
4 66096 0.7351 11.0988 0.2842 
5 72456 0.92037037 11.190735 0.928365151 
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Figure 6. 7: W eibull plot ofboiler feed pwnp recirculation valve 
The equation for the W eibullleast squares plot is 
y= 2.2429x x (-24.704) 
Intercept a= -24.704 
Slope= ~ = 2.2429 
e = 60628.9 
Running Hours per year= 8760 
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Substituting, Reliability= 0.98 
MTTF = 60628.98 f (1 + 0.4458) = 53696 hr 
6.4.1 SUMMARY OF BOILER FEED PUMP RECIRCULATION VALVE 
FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS 
The regression coefficient ~ is 0.814. As per chart in figure 6.1, for a good fit for 
a five failure Weibull analysis, the regression coefficient must be 0.81 and hence the 
regression coefficient is acceptable. The shape parameter fJ is 2.24 and the characteristic 
life B is 60628. The mean time to failure MTTF is 53696 hour. 
6.5 CONDENSER TUBES 
The condenser tubes develop leaks due to vibrating tubes hitting against the 
supporting plates, other than corrosion and tube end defects. Such tube failures have been 
overcome mostly by up grading the tube materials to tungsten. Nineteen tube failures are 
analysed by means ofleast squares approach. They are tabulated in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7: Least squares fit of nineteen failure data of condenser tubes 
i Failure Times.tt F(tt)=i-0.3/5+0.4 Ln(tt) LnLn(l/(1-F(tt}}) 
1 27504 0.0360 10.2220 -3.3036 
2 28584 0.0876 10.2606 -2.3891 
3 30072 0.1391 10.3113 -1.8980 
4 30120 0.1907 10.3129 -1.5529 
5 39744 0.2422 10.5902 -1.2822 
6 40488 0.2938 10.6087 -1.0559 
7 42312 0.3453 10.6528 -0.8587 
8 42792 0.3969 10.6641 -0.6818 
9 42840 0.4484 10.6652 -0.5191 
10 43296 0.5 10.6758 -0.3665 
11 43464 0.5515 10.6796 -0.2207 
12 43728 0.6030 10.6857 -0.0789 
13 43920 0.6546 10.6901 0.0612 
14 44208 0.7061 10.6966 0.2027 
15 44304 0.7577 10.6988 0.3490 
16 44688 0.8092 10.7074 0.5049 
17 50808 0.8608 10.8358 0.6790 
18 58344 0.9123 10.9741 0.8898 
19 58728 0.9639 10.9806 1.2005 
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Figure 6.8: Weibull plotofCcndensertubes 
The equation for the Weibull least squares plot is 
y= 5.1515x x (-55.289) 
Intercept a= -55.289 
Slope= ~ = 5.1515 
e = 45825 
Running Hours per year= 8760 hr 
Reliability = 0.99 
MTTF=45825 r(l +0.1941)=42159hr. 
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6.5.1 SUMMARY OF CONDENSER TUBES FAILURE DATA ANALYSIS 
The regression coefficient r2 is 0.8857. The acceptable regression coefficient r2 
for a 19-failure analysis is 0.887 for Weibull according to the chart in figure 6.1. The 
shape parameter f3 is 5.15. The characteristic life 0 is 45825. The reliability for an 
operation for a year is 0.99. The mean time to failure MTTF is 42159 hrs. 
6.6 SUMMARY OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Table 6.8: Summary of Data Analysis 
Shape Characteristic Running Reliability MTTF Component Parameter Life Hours per for a time Hours Year of year 
Waterwall 12 112795 8760 1 108252 
Sperheater 4.59 65026 8760 0.99 59536 
Reheater 1.5 83561 8760 0.96 75204 
FDFan 2.1 65856 8760 0.98 61246 
Boiler Feed 7.43 150892 8760 I 131276 Pump 
Boiler Feed 
Pump 2.24 60628 8760 0.98 53696 Recirculation 
Valve 
Condenser 5.15 45825 8760 0.99 42159 
6.7 AVAILABILITY OF SOFTWARE 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers has issued a CD ROM called 'Risk 
based methods for equipment life management' to do data analysis. This CD ROM is 
available with ASME International, New York 10016-5990. 
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Chapter 7 
CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT 
In the previous chapter, the failure times of seven critical components were 
modeled using appropriate reliability model, consequently mean time to failure (MTTF) 
and reliability for one year operation were assessed. Once failure probability is known 
inspection interval is decided to check and maintain the component/system. Failure 
probability is an indicator of the reliability of a component and hence it dictates the 
frequency of inspections. Thus Inspection planning is the obvious chapter to follow an 
assessment of failure probability. The consequences of the failure of a component will 
reflect in dollar revenue lost in production of power. The calculation of consequential lost 
revenue forms part of the component replacement procedure. However, in this chapter the 
focus is on the replacement of high risk components rather than optimization of 
inspection interval. Inspections by themselves are not important but it is the action that 
follows an inspection has an impact on the plant operation. The action may be either 
repair or component replacement depending on the findings of the inspection. This 
chapter provides details of cost based optimization to replace/repair defective 
components to ensure reliable operation of the power plant. The replacement/repair 
interval optimization is carried by maximizing NPV (net present value). This step needs 
to be worked out before considering inspections because inspection program 
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development is a resource intensive process that need not be undertaken until it is known 
what it will do (ASME, 2003) 
In this work the replacement cost will be considered instead of the inspection cost.. 
This is mainly because inspection cost is smaller compared to the outage and 
repair/replacement costs. Basing the optimization calculation on inspection costs would 
lead to inaccurate results regarding what equipment need to be inspected. Therefore the 
strategy followed in the present work is to: 
1. Optimize, based upon replacement cost 
2. Inspect using an optimized strategy before the projected component replacement 
date. 
3. Compare the actual component conditions that are found with the projected 
conditions. 
4. Replace the component or calculate a new optimized replacement interval. 
However in this thesis, the time to replace is taken as 2007. The well managed 
companies usually look for a pay back period offive years or some time seven years. 
7.1 MAXIMIZING VALUE TO THE COMPANY 
The emphasis today is on the "value added". The reason for this is that most 
companies are owned by stockholders who aspire at maximizing the return on their 
investment. Maintenance is an area of particular concern because maintenance costs are 
not perceived to be directly connected to production. When a new plant is built, the costs 
associated with fuel and the overheads are alone estimated to arrive at the profits. The 
cost of maintaining the plant is usually not considered at the initial stages partly due to 
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the lack of data and the expectation that there would not any major breakdowns in a new 
plant. As the plant ages, the yearly maintenance budget increases which is separately 
prepared and approved. The maintenance budget is a variable quantity. But the cost of 
fuel and salaries remain do not vary very much and considered as production cost. 
However maintenance is critically important. Therefore, spending a maintenance dollar in 
a manner that does not provide maximum return is not making the best use of the 
stockholder funds nor company resources (ASME, 2003). 
Using net present value (NPV) as a decision making criterion is one way to 
illustrate the "value added" which will accrue as a result of the maintenance program. 
NPV not only considers the investment of resource but also accounts for cash flow 
consequences over the service life of the equipment. This is why maximization of NPV 
is suggested as the decision making criterion for investments (ASME,2003). Maintenance 
expenditures are investments that are made to receive the benefit of production return in 
the near, intermediate and long terms. 
NPV becomes the common denominator for proposals put forward from different 
business lines to the corporate decision makers. This puts all corporate entities on the 
same level with a common communication medium for the corporate decision maker. 
This is why it is so useful in communications and decision making. All the business are 
on the same level with regard to proposals for projects because NPV is the unit of the 
measure for any aspect of the company operation, including maintenance. Maintenance 
engineering proposals benefit, together with engineering analysis results, have been 
difficult to quantify for the decision maker. Concentrating on conversion of maintenance 
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and engineering effects into cash flow and NPV terms will allow these to compete with 
other business lines of the company in a clear manner. The common communication 
medium of dollars ties directly to the language of the decision maker and to stockholders. 
Optimization creates savings by looking at the whole life of the component. The 
real plan is to operate these components for a number of years; therefore, looking at the 
financial effects over this whole frame is most realistic. 
There is a tendency to use payback periods to make project decisions. The difficulty 
with that approach is that it only looks at the short range. A financial process that also 
considers the long range benefit of a project provides a more realistic view of the 
financial considerations over the service life of the component. This longer range view 
occurs when NPV is used as the optimization criterion. For this reason NPV will be used. 
7.2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
One of the most important characteristics of the analytical approach to maintenance 
optimization is its use ofNPV as the decision making criterion. The key to a smooth and 
a successful integration of maintenance and engineering decision making into mainstream 
corporate decisions is the calculation of NPV by including lost production costs in the 
failure consequence cost. This is because the corporate decision making criteria are being 
used to express the need for maintenance resources. (ASME, 2003) 
The specific elements of the optimization model are: 
1. The replacement or repair cost of the components of concern 
2. Realistic constraints such as annual budget costs 
3. The production loss consequence if the component is not replaced 
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4. The production loss consequences if the component is replaced 
5. The facility safety constraint 
Items 1 and 4 are costs related to the component replacement and implementation 
costs. Item 4 is the consequence avoided by replacing the component and it is the gross 
benefit. Item 2 keeps the expenses in check by disqualifying strategies that are 
unaffordable. Item 5 keeps out any strategy that compromises safety (ASME, 2003). 
7.2.1 THE CONCEPT OF NET PRESENT VALUE 
Let us assume that a house has burned down leaving the owher with the vacant land 
worth $30,000 and a cheque for $100,000 from the home insurance company. The owner 
considers rebuilding the house but he is advised by investors to build an office building to 
be sold after a year. The advisors expect a shortage of office space and expect that the 
building could be sold for $300,000. The construction of the office building would cost 
$200,000 including the insurance pay out and the cost of land which might otherwise be 
sold for $ 30,000. Thus the owner would be investing 230,000 in the hope of realizing 
$300,000 in one year from now. The owner must ask himself the question "What is the 
value of $300,000 (earned one year from now) in terms of today's money (Brealey, 
1986). 
7.2.1.1 PRESENT VALUE 
The present value of $300,000 one year from now is less than $300,000. The reason 
for this is summed up by the following principle: a dollar today is worth more than a 
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dollar tomorrow, because the dollar today can be invested to start earning interest 
immediately. 
Thus the present value of a delayed pay off may be found by multiplying the pay 
off by a discount factor that is less than one. If the discount factor was greater than one, a 
dollar today would be worth less than a dollar tomorrow. If Ct denotes the expected 
payoff at time period l(one year hence), then 
Present Value (PV) =discount factor x c, 
The discount factor is expressed as the reciprocal of one plus a rate of return: 
Discount factor = - 1-
I+r 
The rate of return r is the reward investors demand for accepting delayed payment. 
Considering the real estate investment, assuming for the moment that the $300,000 pay 
off is certain, the office building is not the only way to obtain $300,000 a year from now. 
$300,000 can be invested in Federal Government bonds for a year. Assuming that these 
bonds yield 5% interest, 300•000 has to be invested now to get $300,000 after a year. 
1+0.05 
The invested amount is $ 285,714 now. If the owner wants to sell the project just after he 
has committed the land and started construction on the building, any investor would be 
willing to pay $285,714. This is what it will cost the investors to earn $300,000 in 
government bonds. Of course, the owner can sell for a lower price. But why should he 
sell for a less price than the market will bear. Therefore, the present value is also its 
market value. 
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To calculate the present value, the expected future pay offs is discounted by the rate 
of return offered by comparable investment alternatives. The rate of return is often 
referred to as the discount rate, hurdle rate, or opportunity cost of capital. In this example, 
the Present value is obtained by dividing $300,000 by 1.05. 
. 300 000 Therefore, PV =discount factor X cl = ' = 285,714 
1.05 
7.2.1.2 NET PRESENT VALUE 
The office building is worth $285,714. This does not mean that the owner is $ 
285,714 better off. He committed $230,000 and therefore his net present value is $ 
55,714. Net present value (NPV) is found by subtracting the required investment. 
NPV =PV- required investment= 285,714-230,000 = $55,714 
In other words the office development is worth more than it costs. It makes a net 
contribution to value. The formula is.(Brealey, 1986) 
NPV= C +C. 0 l+r (7.1) 
Co is the cash flow at time 0 (that is today) will usually be a negative number. In other 
words, Co is an investment and therefore a cash outflow. In this example, Co=- $230,000 
Therefore NPV has to be positive to earn profit. 
7.2.2 APPLICATION OF NPV TO COMPONENT REPLACEMENT 
Component replacement is also an investment but its usefulness is manifested as an 
increase in the overall of efficiency of the plant. The losses caused by having one 
inefficient component can be estimated and expressed in terms of lost power. The power 
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lost represents financial loss. Therefore Eq 7.1 is written in tenus of losses and 
investment. 
The reasoning behind the model is this: (ASME,2003). 
If the proposed component replacement is not implemented, there will be certain 
production losses, e.g.; a "Do nothing different" or "Base Case" (ASME, 2003 Risk 
Based Methods for Equipment Life Management page 159) cost. Let this be C8 
If the proposed component is replaced, there will be lower total production losses.e.g: 
"With project" or "Alternative Case" cost. Let this be CA 
If the proposed component is replaced, there will be a cost for component and its 
installation. Let this be Cp 
If the sum of the cash flows for the component replacement cost and the Alternative Case 
production loss cost is greater than the Base Case production loss cost cash flow, then a 
negative NPV will result. Writing as an equation (ASME, 2003) 
NPV = Ca- (Cp + CA) < 0. (7.2) 
The component will not be replaced. It is not profitable to replace the component, the 
component should not be replaced .. 
If the reverse is true, then the Base Case production loss cost cash flow is greater than 
component replacement cost plus the Alternative Case production loss cost, then the NPV 
will be positive. Writing as an equation (ASME, 2003) 
NPV = Ca- (Cp + CA)>O (7.3) 
It is· more profitable to replace the component. The component replacement can be 
approved. 
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To illustrate the above concepts the following scenario is considered. 
1. A house has an old wooden window. The wood has become soft. There is a concern 
that the window may leak during winter. 
2. The owner of the house is contemplating repairing wood that has become soft the at 
a cost of$75. 
If the owner continues to live with old wooden window the probability of a leaky 
window is 50% this year and 90% next year. 
3. If the owner replaces the window, the probability of leak is 10% this year and 20% 
next year 
4. The consequences of having a leaky window will be higher heating bill by $600 per 
year. 
Should the window be replaced this year or next year? 
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Base case cash flow 
"Do nothing different" 
failure probabilityfor 
year 1 (0.5) 
Consequential 
cost if leak 
occurs 
$300 
"Do nothing 
different"Change in 
failure probability 
year (0.4) 
Consequential 
cost if leak occurs 
$300 
"Do nothing 
different" expected 
consequent cost 
$270 
Alternate case cash flow 
"Repair year 1" 
failure probabilityfor 
year 1 (0.1) 
Consequential 
cost if leak 
occurs 
$300 
"Repair year 1" 
Change in failure 
probability year 
2( .1) 
Consequential 
cost if leak occurs 
$300 
"Repair 1 year " 
expected 
consequent cost 
$60 
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Repair cost $75 
Net Present value 
in repair year one 
$135 
Fligure 7.1:NPVCalculation for "Do nothing" vs "Repair in year 1" 
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Base case cash flow 
"Do nothing different" 
failure probabilityfor 
year 1 (0.5) 
Consequential 
cost if leak 
occurs 
$300 
"Do nothing 
different"Change in 
failure probability 
year ,(0.4) 
Consequential cost 
if leak occurs 
$300 
"Do nothing 
different" expected 
consequent cost 
$270 
Alternate case cash flow 
"Do nothing different" 
failure probabilityfor 
year 1 (0.5) 
Consequential 
cost if leak 
occurs 
$300 
"Repair in 
year2"Change in 
failure probability for 
year 2,(0.1) 
Consequential cost 
if leak occurs 
$300 
"Repair year 2 " 
expected 
consequent cost 
$180 
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Repair cost $75 
Net Present value 
in repair in year 
two $15 
Figure 7.2 NPV Calculation for "Do Nothing vs Repair in Year 2" 
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The year that produces the highest positive NPV must be chosen. In the example shown 
in Fig 7.1 and 7.2, the highest NPV is for repair in the first year. Therefore component 
replacement should be in the year which will produce the highest positive NPV. 
7.3 THE MODEL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The decision model is best illustrated by the decision analysis influence diagram. 
An influence diagram graphically represents the relationships that link a decision with its 
outcomes and their consequences.(ASME,2003). 
The purpose of the influence diagram is to link the failure probability and NPV. 
Engineers have often had difficulty expressing the need for financial resources in a 
format that communicated with the financial world. The influence diagram is a 
communication tool that explains the make up of the decision and what influences it. The 
influence diagram contains no numbers and can be understood by plant personnel and 
company executives. 
The necessary nodes between the decision and the financial outcome are the 
consequences and relationship information that link them to form a complete model. To 
construct the diagram, a beginning is made at the node NPV on the right. Then question 
the information that is needed to arrive at NPV. In this fashion move towards left until 
the decision node is reached at the left. The engineering state of the component as 
expressed by the failure probability determines the performance of the component as a 
result of the decision made. The relationships that convert the failure probability to 
components of NPV form the bridge between engineering and finance. Fig7.3 is the 
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influence diagram for the window repair example. The real question is "What are the 
magnitudes of the losses due to a leaky window." 
Expected 
consequential cost 
without repair 
Expected 
consequential cost 
with repair 
Cost of 
repair 
Figure 7.3: Influence Diagram for window repair 
7.4 WATERWALL REPLACEMENT 
The waterwalls of a boiler forms the walls of the boiler furnace. The waterwall 
tubes are subjected to a furnace temperature of approximatelyl400 °C. The boiler water 
that flows through the tubes is chemically treated to maintain a pH value of about 9. 
Waterwall tubes are susceptible to deviations in the chemistry of the b0Uer water. Both 
the fire side and feed water side of the tubes can deteriorate due to combustion excursions 
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like variations in combustion air, fuel oil pressure, steam atomizing pressure and furnace 
pressure. Under these circumstances waterwall tubes are replaced in aging boilers. A 
boiler waterwall replacement that took place recently is analyzed. The boiler capacity 
was 175 MW. When a tube fails, it takes 72 hours to bring the boiler back to service. 
These hours are required as time is needed for cooling the furnace to enable workers to 
enter and build access for welders, NDT technicians, and inspectors. During this time, the 
lost power has to be generated by running the gas turbines. It costs $135 to produce 1 
MW using the gas turbine. It costs $65 to produce 1 MW using an oil fired boiler. 
Therefore the incremental cost is $70 per MW due to a waterwall tube failure. The cost of 
labour and material needed to repair one waterwall tube failure is $20,000. The cost of 
fuel needed to start a boiler from a standstill is $45,000, to reach the levels of the boiler 
parameters to the rated pressure and temperature. The wages to be paid for additional 
personnel to correct instrumentation and electrical problems that may come up during a 
boiler start up. The metallurgical laboratories charge $2000 to analyze a failed tube. 
Therefore, a waterwall tube failure costs $949,000 to the plant. The cost of replacement 
of a panel or a section of the furnace waterwall where NDT has revealed tube thinning 
costs $1,000,000. The following calculation shows the validity of incurring an 
expenditure of $1,000,000 in waterwall replacement. 
MTTF for waterwall tubes. Ref Table 6.8 
Base year for data 
Year of replacement 
Number hours of operation from 1993 to 2007 
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Number of failures expected in 2007 
Loss of generation due to waterwall failure 
Time taken to repair waterwall tube 
Incremental Cost of generating, 175 MW 
By Gas Turbine to make up for the loss @$70.00/MW 
Cost of Repairing Failed waterwall 
Cost of Laboratory analysis for failed tube 
Cost of Boiler start up after waterwall repair 
Cost of one waterwall failure 
Cost of two waterwall failures, Cs 
Cost of water wall replacement in the failure zone, Cp 
Running Hours for 5 years 
Expected failure in 5 years after replacement, CA 
The project will be implemented if: 
NPV = Cs- (Cp+ CA) > 0 
Substituting for NPV as per Eq 7.3, 
1,898000- ( 1 ,000,000 + 0) = $898,000 
1.2 say 2 
175MW 
72 hours 
$882,000 
$20,000 
$2000 
$45,000 
$949,000 
$1,898,000 
$1,000,000 
43800 hours 
0 
As NPV is more than zero, the project will have to be implemented. It is obvious 
that implementation of the project beyond 2007 will increase losses and hence the year of 
implementation should be 2007 or earlier. A time ordered waterwall influence diagram is 
shown in figure 7.5. 
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Implement 
Project 
Annual forced 
outage hours if 
waterw nils not 
&dgct 
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outage if 
waterwalls 
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Annual forc~'d 
outage cost if 
wnterwalls not 
replac~'d 
Total discounted 
forced outage if 
w aterw nils not 
implemented 
Total discounted 
forced outage if 
wnterwulls 
replaced 
Wnterwnll 
replacement cost 
Figure 7.4: Time ordered influence diagram for Waterwall maintenance optimization model 
7.5 SUPERHEATER REPLACEMENT 
The superheaters are affected by creep in aging boilers and due to temperature 
excursions. Sometimes the tubes lose their hardness due to overheating in a particular 
zone. Stress corrosion cracking due to bad water chemistry coupled with high residual 
stresses can cause tube failures. The expenses of boiler downtime, tube repair cost, boiler 
start up cost, laboratory cost, and cost of gas turbine power are all the same as for boiler 
waterwall. The differences are the cost of a superheater replacement panel and the 
number of failures. As the NPV is positive, the superheater replacement must be carried 
out. 
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MTTF for Superheater tubes. Ref Table 6.8 
Base year for data 
Year of replacement 
Number hours of operation from 1993 to 2007 
Number of failures expected in 2007 
Loss of generation due to Superheater failure 
Time taken to repair Superheater tube 
Incremental Cost of generating , 175 MW 
By Gas Turbine to make up for the loss @$70.00/MW 
Cost of Repairing Failed Superheater 
Cost of Laboratory analysis for failed tube 
Cost of Boiler start up after Superheater repair 
Cost of one Superheater failure 
Cost of three Superheater failures, C8 
Cost of Superheater replacement in the failure zone, Cp 
Running Hours for 5 years 
Expected failure in 5 years after replacement 
Cost of one failure, CA 
The project will be implemented if: 
NPV = Cs- (Cp + CA) > 0 
Substituting for NPV as per Eq 7.3, 
2,847,000- (1,741,000 +949,000) = $157,000 
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59536 hours 
1993 
2007 
131400 
2.2 Say 3 
175MW 
72 hours 
$882,000 
$20,000 
$2000 
$45,000 
$949,000 
$2,847,000 
$1,741,000 
43800 hours 
0.73 Say 1 
$949,000 
Chapter 7: Consequence Assessment 
7.6 REHEATER REPLACEMENT 
The reheater is located in the convection zone and is not subjected to high 
temperature radiation. However, the tube bundles can distort and break. This is due to 
uncontrolled furnace exit gas during start up when reheater tubes will have no steam flow 
due to turbine not being in service. When tube bundles have been found to have mis-
aligned and warping, the defective bundle is replaced. The analysis described below 
belongs to such a reheater panel replacement. The tube repair and other expenses 
associated with reheater are identical to waterwall and superheater. The cost of a reheater 
panel including labour and material is $786800 
MTTF for Reheater tubes. Ref Table 6.8 75204 hours 
Base year for data 
Year of replacement 
Number hours of operation from 1993 to 2007 
Number of failures expected in 2007 
Loss of generation due to Reheater failure 
Time taken to repair Reheater tube 
Incremental Cost of generating,l75 MW 
By Gas Turbine to make up for the loss @$70.00/MW 
Cost of Repairing Failed Reheater 
Cost of Laboratory analysis for failed tube 
Cost of Boiler start up after Reheater repair 
Cost of one Reheater failure 
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1.7 say 2 
175MW 
72 hours 
$882,000 
$20,000 
$2000 
$45,000 
$949,000 
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Cost of two Reheater failures, Ca 
Cost of Reheater replacement in the failure zone, Cp 
Running Hours for 5 years 
Expected failure in 5 years after replacement 
Cost of one failure, CA 
The project will be implemented if: 
NPV = Ca- (Cp + CA) > 0 
Substituting for NPV as per Eq 7.3, 
1,898,000- (786800 + 949000) =$162,200 
As the NPV is positive, the replacement of reheater is justified. 
7.7 FORCED DRAFf FAN RUNNER REFURBISHMENT 
$1,898,000 
$786800 
43800 hours 
0.58 Say 1 
$949,000 
The Forced draft fan problems are mostly due to cracks in the rotor. The rotor is a 
fabricated body of welded plates. As the fan pushes the air to the furnace, it sometimes 
has resistance on the flow path if the rotary air heater is choked due to grit build up on the 
rotary elements. The fan rotor plates develop cracks. These cracks are welded during 
annual outages. A stage is reached when the whole rotor needs to be refurbished due 
excess repairs to the rotor or the cracks are larger and cause fan vibration. Data pertaining 
to a case when the rotor had to be shipped to the original equipment manufacturer for 
refurbishment is discussed below. The cost of refurbishing the fan was $25,000 
MTTF for FD Fan. Ref Table 6.8 34731 hours 
Base year for data 
Year of replacement 
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Number hours of operation from 1993 to 2007 
Number of failures expected in 2007 
Loss of generation due to FD Fan Failure failure 
Power Produced with one FD Fan 
Time taken to repair Refurbish a Fan 
Incremental Cost of generating, 175 MW 
By Gas Turbine to make up for the loss @$70.00/MW, CA 
Cost of Refurbishing, Cp 
Cost of four failures, Cs 
Running Hours for 5 years 
Expected failure in 5 years after replacement 
Substituting for NPV as per Eq7 .2, 
NPV = Cs- (Cp + CA) > 0 
17,640,000- (25,000 + 4,410,000) =$13,205,000 
7.8 BOILER FEED PUMP REPLACEMENT 
131400 
3.78 
125MW 
50MW 
504 hours 
$4,410,000 
$25,000 
$17,640,000 
43800 hours 
1.26 Say 1 
The boiler feed pump handles high pressure and hot water. The pressure is about2000 
psi and temperature about 1000 °F. The usual problems are vibration, mechanical seal 
failure and lubrication oil leaks. Most of these problems do not occur often as the pump 
internals are replaced once in seven years. However boiler feed pumps do fail. The loss 
of one pump does not bring the generation down to zero, as the high pressure feed water 
system consists of two 50% duty pumps and one pump can keep the boiler in service at 
50% load. The financial loss is much less than that of waterwall, superheater or reheater 
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failures. The cost of replacing one pump is $93,000. The boiler feed pump failure data 
analysis is as below. 
MTTF for Boiler Feed Pump. Ref Table 6.8 
Base year for data 
Year of replacement 
Number hours of operation from 1993 to 2007 
Number of failures expected in 2007 
Loss of generation due to Boiler Feed Pump failure 
(Boiler Feed Pump 50% Duty in 175 MW Unit) 
Time taken to repair Boiler Feed Pump 
Incremental cost of generating 
By Gas Turbine to make up for the loss @$70.00/MW, CA 
When two failures occur running the gas turbine cost, C8 
Cost of replacing a Pump, Cp 
Running Hours for 5 years 
Expected failure in 5 years after replacement 
Substituting for NPV as per Eq 7.2 
NPV = Cs- (Cp + CA) > 0 
806400- (93000 + 403200) =$31 0200 
The positive NPV justifies boiler feed pump replacement. 
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1993 
2007 
131400 
1.8 Say 2 
90MW 
64 hours 
175MW 
$403,200 
$806,400 
$93,000 
43800 hours 
0.61 Say 1 
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7.9 BOILER FEED PUMP RECIRCULATION VALVE REPLACEMENT 
The boiler feed pump recirculation valve diverts the high pressure boiler feed pump 
discharge to the feedwater tank when the boiler feed pump discharge valve is closed 
during boiler start up to control water level in the boiler steam drum. Therefore there is a 
high pressure differential across the valve seat and plug. The seat and plug get eroded. 
The valve leaks and no longer provided the service it is intended for. Refurbishing a 
valve costs $7000. When a boiler feed pump recirculation valve fails, the corresponding 
boiler feed pump can not be operated. Hence the boiler can generate 50% load with 
available boiler feed pump. It takes 40 hours to get a valve refurbished. The analysis of 
the failure data is described below. The NPV is calculated and is positive for 
MTTF forB F P Recirculation Valve. Ref Table 6.8 53696 hours 
Base year for data 
Year of replacement 
Number hours of operation from 1993 to 2007 
Number of failures expected in 2007 
Loss of generation due to Boiler Feed Pump failure 
(Boiler Feed Pump 50% Duty in 175 MW Unit) 
Time taken to repair a Boiler Feed Pump Recirc Valve 
Incremental Cost of generating, 17 5 MW 
By Gas Turbine to make up for the loss @$70.00/MW, CA 
Cost of Repairing a Recirculation Valve 
Total cost for repairing three valves, C8 
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1993 
2007 
131,400 
2.4 Say 3 
90MW 
40 hours 
$252,000 
$7000 
$777,000 
Cost of replacing by different valve, Cp 
Running Hours for 5 years 
Expected failure in 5 years after replacement 
Substituting for NPV as per Eq 7 .2, 
NPV = Cs- (Cp+ CA) > 0 
777,000- (50,000 + 252000) =$475,000 
7.10 CONDENSER TUBES REPLACEMENT 
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$50,000 
43800 hours 
0.8 Say 1 
The condenser tubes fail mostly due to mechanical friction between the tubes and the 
stay plates, which support the tubes along its length. They also fail at their ends where the 
tubes are expanded. When a condenser tube fails the condenser section where the tube is 
located is isolated and the power generation has to be cut by 50%. The cost of retubing is 
$500,000. A positive NPV is obtained . 
MTTF for Condenser tubes .Ref Table 6.8 
Base year for data 
Year of replacement 
Number hours of operation from 1993 to 2007 
Number of failures expected in 2007 
Loss of generation due to Condenser tube failure 
(Condenser 50% Duty in 175 MW Units) 
Time taken to repair a Condenser tube 
Incremental Cost of generating, 175 MW 
By Gas Turbine to make up for the loss @$70.00/MW, CA 
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1993 
2007 
131400 
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90MW 
40 hours 
$252,000 
Cost of repairing three failures, Ca 
Cost of replacing by Condenser tubes, Cp 
Running Hours for 5 years 
Expected failure in 5 years after replacement 
Substituting for NPV as per Eq7 .2, 
NPV = Ca- (Cp + CA) > 0 
756,000- (500,000 + 252000) =$4000 
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$756,000 
$500,000 
43800 hours 
1.03 Say 1 
7.11 SUMMARY OF COMPONENT REPLACEMENT 
The components that will be replaced in year 2007 are summed up in Table 7 .1. The 
Year 2007 is selected because of increasing failure probability in the following years. The 
procedure remains the same regardless of the year of replacement. The loss of generation 
of power will be less if replaced earlier and more if replaced later. 
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Table 7.1: Component Replacement Optimization Summary 
Increment 
Component Increment production production cost if 
replacement/ cost if the 
Component refurbishment the component is component is Net present 
Cost not replaced/ replaced/ value 
Cp Refurbished Refurbished 
Co CA 
Waterwall 1,898000 $1,000,000 0 $898,000 
Superheater $1,741,000 $2,847,000 $949,000 $157,000 
Reheater $756,800 1,898,000 $949000 $162,200 
Forced $25,000 $17,640,000 $4,441,000 $13,205,000 Draft Fan 
Boiler Feed $93,000 $806,400 $403,200 $310,200 Pump 
Boiler Feed 
Pump $50,000 $777,000 $252,000 $475,000 Recirculatio 
n valve 
Condenser $500,000 $756,000 $252,000 $4000 Tubes 
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Chapter 8 
INSPECTION PROGRAM OPTIMIZATION 
In the previous chapter, the focus was on identifying components that needed 
immediate attention and now an inspection program has to be developed to provide 
proper maintenance to components. A decision analysis requires to be done through a 
decision model. Decision analysis is "a formal process for organizing the information, 
including measures of information uncertainty that will influence a future course of 
action or inaction, mathematically modeling the information and making calculations that 
will help identify the best decision and/or determine what additional information is 
necessary." (ASME.2003 Risk Based Methods for Equipment Life Management. Page 
216) A decision model is to be developed to link the failure probability versus time to 
failure data for each inspection program decision that will be considered. An inspection 
program should be able to detect the failure mode at early stage to prevent a failure. It is 
not an easy task to develop/select the proper inspection program as data gathering, 
reliability modelling and decision-making are tedious tasks. The goal of this chapter is to 
develop a decision model for inspection planning. Prior to developing an optimized 
inspection program for waterwall tubes, the concept is explained by a simple example. 
For clarity of the concept, a hypothetical case is assumed. 
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A pump has a corroded discharge pipe and the pipe runs from the first floor to the 
fifth floor. There are electrical switchboards located directly under the corroded pipe. 
The plant can either run the system with the corroded pipe with the risk of a leak or run 
the system after having replaced the corroded pipe. The following data are assumed. 
1. Failure Probability if run with corroded pipe 
2. Failure Probability if run with replaced piping 
3. Consequential cost if pipe breaks at lower floors 
4. Consequential cost if pipe breaks at upper floor 
70% 
10% 
$500 
$1000 
The subsequent pages explain the general requirements for an inspection program with an 
emphasis on the example chosen to bring forth the concept. 
8.1 STRATEGY TABLE 
The first step is to construct a strategy table. The strategy table consists of the 
things to do for inspection. These are broad classifications of scope of work and items of 
interest. They are categories, candidate strategies and damage mechanisms. Table 8.1 
illustrates the basic worksheet to form the strategy table. 
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Table 8.1: Original Worksheet 
Candidate Damage Categories Strategies Mechanisms 
8.1.1CATEGORIES 
With reference to 8.1, a category can be any of the following or all of the 
following (ASME, 2003 Risk Based Methods for Equipment Life Management. Page 
195) 
"A quantity that you need to know before you can estimate the economic decision 
criteria or 
A resource that you will need to choose before you can estimate the economic 
decision criteria 
A value that you need to calculate" 
The above definition of categories is explained as below 
1. Category is a quantity. This quantity can be the number of tubes in a 
waterwall planned for inspection. The number of tubes has an impact on the cost 
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of inspection. If more number of tubes are planned for inspection, it is going to 
cost more and ifless, less economic impact. Hence this quantity is a category. or 
2. A resource that has to be chosen before estimating the economic decision 
criteria. This resource can be either skyclimber Fig 8:1 and 8.2 or scaffolding Fig 
8.3 and 8.4. The waterwall tubes are at several levels inside the furnace. To 
inspect a tube at a height of 80 feet, there is a need for scaffolding to be built from 
the bottom floor The tube at 80 feet, can also be inspected by a skyclimber which 
will slide on the waterwall tubes from the bottom floor with a platform for 
inspectors to ride. A decision has to be made whether to use scaffolding or 
skyclimber to access the tubes. The skyclimber and scaffolding become categories 
3. A value that has to be calculated. There will be money to be spent on 
inspection of tubes, building a scaffolding,or installing a skyclimber This amount 
of money that is to be spent in is a value. This value can be Net Present Value. 
Therefore, NPV is a category. 
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Figure 8.1: Sky climber being assembled inside the boiler furnace (3S Gondala, 
Division ofFicont Industry Inc. Beijing China) 
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Figure 8.3: Scaffolding inside boiler furnace to inspect water wall. (Holyrood Generating 
station) 
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Figure 8.4: Scaffolding at the roof of the boiler furnace for tube inspection(Holyrood 
Generating Station) 
When developing an inspection strategy, the categories will include the decisions 
that will be required to be made and tools that will be required to perform the inspection. 
It is preferable to make a list of categories to be considered and their magnitude on plain 
paper and brainstorm before making a decision. A list for a corroded pipe replacement 
decision might be: 
1. Pipe condition 
Whether the pipe is fit for service or defective or likely to failure 
2. Probability of rupture 
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The probability that the pipe will fail during service 
3. Pump use 
The chances of pump being used either for first floor use or for second floor 
use expressed in terms of percentage 
4. Consequent cost of rupture 
The financial loss when the pipe breaks 
5. Risk of rupture 
It is the product of probability times the consequential cost of rupture 
6. Pipe replacement cost 
The price to be paid if the pipe is replaced 
7. Net Present value 
Net Present Value is an amount that expresses how much value an investment 
will result in. This is done by measuring all cash flows over time back, 
towards the current point, in present time. The NPV should be positive for a 
successful investment. 
8.1.2 CANDIDATE STRATEGIES 
Candidate strategies mean the choices available to the plant. The candidates in this 
example are "to run" or "replace". In some other situation, it may be "inspect" or "not to 
inspect" The candidate strategy will be the first column in the excel spreadsheet. As 
inspection is the aim, all inspection methods will be listed under this column. This is only 
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for brainstorming discussion to decide the appropriate inspection method. Typical 
inspection methods include: 
1. Ultrasonic Thickness measurement 
Ultrasonic non-destructive testing characterizing material thickness, integrity, or 
other physical properties by means of high frequency sound waves is a widely used 
technique for quality control. In thickness gauging, ultrasonic techniques pennit quick 
and reliable measurement of thickness without requiring access to both sides of the part. 
The thickness gauge determines the thickness of a part or structure by accurately 
measuring the time required for a short ultrasonic pulse generated by a transducer to 
travel through the thickness of the material , reflect from the back or inside surface and 
be returned to the transducer. 
2. Replication for Creep 
This method examines the actual microstructure of a suspect metal surface. The 
metal surface suspected to have undergone creep is polished to a mirror finish using 
successive grinding and polishing discs, followed finally by a diamond impregnated 
cloth. The topography of the surface is replicated on a 1 inch square cellulose acetate film. 
The microstructure of the metal surface can be seen when the film is viewed through a 
portable microscope with a 400x magnification. The degradation of the carbon and iron 
boundaries will reveal the amount creep. 
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3. Magnetic Particle Inspection 
Magnetic particle inspection is used for the detection of surface and near surface 
flaws in ferromagnetic materials. A magnetic field is applied to the specimen either 
locally or overall, using a permanent magnet, electromagnet, flexible cables or hand held 
prods. If the material is sound most of the magnetic flux is concentrated below the 
material surface. However if a flaw is present, such that it interacts with magnetic field, 
the flux is distorted locally and leaks from the surface of the specimen in the region of the 
flaw. Fine magnetic particles applied to the surface of the specimen are attracted to the 
area of flux leakage, creating visible indication of the flaw. The materials commonly used 
for this purpose are black iron particles and red yellow stone iron oxides. 
4. Low Frequency Electromagnetic Technique 
Very-Low-Frequency (VLF) surveying is a continuous-wave (frequency domain) 
electromagnetic technique that uses low-frequency radio transmissions as the source. 
When these intersect a buried deposit they induce eddy currents that generate a secondary 
magnetic field concentric around the source of the currents. VLF surveys involve 
measuring the orientation of this field. As the instrument passes perpendicularly over a 
vertical target the vector orientation changes from a maximum on one side to a minimum 
on the other side. The method is primarily used in mineral exploration work but has also 
been successfully applied in finding the size of boiler tube internal deposits 
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5. Ultrasonic Flaw Detection 
High frequency sound waves reflect from flaws in predictable ways, producing 
distinctive echo patterns that can be displayed and recorded by portable instruments. It 
utilizes the basic principle that sound energy traveling through a medium will continue to 
propagate until it either disperses or reflects off a boundary with another material, such as 
the air surrounding a far wall or found inside a crack. In this type of test, the operator 
couples the transducer to the test piece and locates the echo returning from the far wall of 
the test piece, and then looks for any echoes that arrive ahead of that backwall echo, 
discounting grain scatter noise if present. An acoustically significant echo that precedes 
the backwall echo implies the presence of a laminar crack or void. Through further 
analysis, the depth, size, and shape of the structure producing the reflection can be 
determined. 
8.1.3 DAMAGE MECHANISMS 
The second column would be 'Damage Mechanisms'. The appropriate damage 
mechanism for the component under inspection will be entered in this column. The 
damage mechanism for the hypothetical pump example is corrosion. Typical damage 
mechanisms are for boiler tubes are described below: 
!.Overheating 
Overheating may be long time or short time. Long time overheating is a condition 
in which metal temperatures exceed design limits for days, weeks, months, or longer. A 
mild steel tube subject to temperatures above 850°F (450°C) for more than a few days 
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may experience long term overheating. Short term overheating occurs when the tube 
temperature rises above design limits for a brief period. In all instances, metal 
temperatures are at least 850°F (450°C) and often exceed 1350°C (730°C). Depending on 
temperature, failure may occur in a very short time. 
2.Caustic Corrosion 
Two critical factors contribute to caustic corrosion. The first is the availability of 
sodium hydroxide or of alkaline producing salts. Sodium hydroxide is often intentionally 
added to boiler water at non corrosive levels. It may also be introduced unintentionally if 
chemical from a caustically regenerated demineralizer is inadvertently released into make 
up water. Alkaline producing salts may also contaminate the condensate by in leakage 
through condensers or from process streams. The second contributing factor is the 
mechanism of concentration. High pH substances such as sodium hydroxide will dissolve 
magnetite: (Port, 1991) 
4NaOH + Fe304--+ 2NaFe 02+ Na2Fe 02+ 2H20 (8.1) 
When magnetite is removed the sodium hydroxide may react directly with the iron: 
Fe+2NaOH-+Na2Fe02+H2 (8.2) 
3. Hydrogen damage 
Hydrogen damage may occur where corrosion reactions result in the production of 
atomic hydrogen. When a tube has failed due to hydrogen damage, the failed portion has 
the appearance of an open window. Prolonged boiler operation with sea water ingress 
caused by turbine condenser tube leak leads to accumulation of alkaline producing salts 
in boiler tubes. This type of damage has recently occurred at Holyrood Generating 
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Station and resulted in large sections of the waterwall tube replacement. The inspection 
optimization in this thesis is based on this project. Damage resulting from high pH 
corrosion reaction or from a low pH corrosion reaction is simply caustic corrosion. 
Concentrated sodium hydroxide dissolves the magnetic iron oxide according to the 
following reaction: 
4Na0H + Fe304 - 2NaFe 02+ Na2Fe 02+ 2H20 (8.3) 
With the protective layer destroyed, water is then able to react directly with iron to evolve 
atomic hydrogen: 
3Fe+4H20- Fe304+ 8Hf (8.4) 
The sodium hydroxide itself may also react with the iron to produce hydrogen: 
Fe+2NaOH-Na2Fe02+2Ht (8.5) 
If atomic hydrogen is liberated, it is capable of diffusing into the steel. Some of this 
diffused atomic hydrogen will combine at grain boundaries or inclusion in the metal to 
produce molecular hydrogen or will react with iron carbide in the metal to produce 
methane. 
(8.6) 
Since neither molecular hydrogen nor methane is capable of diffusing through the steel, 
these gases accumulate primarily at grain boundaries. Eventually gas pressure will cause 
separation of the metal at its grain boundaries, producing discontinuous intergranular 
microcracks. Accumulation of microcracks cause failure of the tube.(Port, 1991) 
4.Stress Corrosion Cracking 
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Stress corrosion cracking could occur wherever a specific corrodent and sufficient 
tensile stresses coexist. The tensile stresses may be applied by internal pressure or by 
residual stresses induced by welding. In boiler systems, carbon steel is specifically 
sensitive to concentrated sodium hydroxide, while stainless steel is specifically sensitive 
to both sodium hydroxide and chlorides. The combination of sodium hydroxide, some 
soluble silica and tensile stresses will cause continuous intergranualar cracks to form in 
carbon steel. As the cracks progress, the strength of the remaining intact metal is 
exceeded and a brittle thick walled fracture will occur. 
8.1.4 NODES FOR EACH CATEGORY 
Each category is allotted a node. The nodes are: 
1. Decision Nodes: -Decision needs to be made as to which of the categories are to be 
selected. e.g: How many elements to inspect. 
2. Chance Nodes:-Categories which may produce several different results. e.g.: How 
sensitive is a measurement to NPV. 
3. Value Nodes:-ls a number calculated. e.g.: Net Present Value. 
8.2 ORDERED CATEGORIES TABLE 
In this table, the node types are decided tbr each category. To decide on the node type, 
the type of information that would be put into each category should be ascertained. For 
example a category "Probability of Failure Today Based on Trend." needs a node to be 
decided. This category needs a single numeric estimation from past data, so this node is a 
value node. On the other hand the "inspection sensitivity" category requires uncertainty 
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infonnation, so this node is a chance node. Table 8.2 illustrates this stage in the 
development of the model for the hypothetical pump example. 
Table 8.2. Ordered Categories for Pump 
Candidate Damage 
Strateges Mechanisms 
Run 
Replace 
Node 
Type 
Decision 
Corrosion 
Catagories 
Pipe Probabilityp ConsequentRisk Pipe Net 
Condition of ump Cost of of Replacement Present 
Use VI Rupture Rupture Rupture Cost a ue 
Chance Chance Chance Value Value Value Value 
8.3 PROVIDING ALTERN ATE STRATEGIES 
Alternatives need to be provided for each constituent in the table. The alternatives 
will be developed from the node under each category and each of the candidate strategies. 
The first step is to look at the node under a 'category' or 'candidate strategies'. A 
decision node will produce a list of alternative for the item above that node. The node 
under 'candidate strategy' is 'decision'. This means that a specific decision should be 
made. In the pump example, in Table 8.3, a decision has to be taken whether to replace 
the pipe or to run the pump with a corroded pipe. A chance node will mention possible 
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outcomes. A category above a value node in the table will require a numerical value to be 
calculated and provided. 
8.3.1 ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES 
The Table 8.3 lists the alternate choices and the data that are available for each 
category. Lcoking at the 'candidate strategies' a decision has to be made whether to run 
the pump with a corroded pipe or to replace the corroded pipe. Listed under the damage 
mechanism is corrosion. There is no choice to be made in the damage mechanism. It is a 
prevailing condition of the pipe. The condition of the pipe is either good or poor, 
depending upon whether it is a replaced pipe or corroded pipe respectively. Under the 
'probability of failure', 0. 7 is associated with corroded pipe and 0.1 failure probability is 
associated with a replaced pipe. 90% of the pumped flow is along the lower floor and 
10% of the flow is along the upper floor. This information is provided under 'pump use'. 
The risk of failure is to be calculated and it is a value node. The cost of replacing a pipe is 
$100. The net present value is a numerical value and it has to be calculated. 
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Table 8.3. Alternate Possibilities for Pump 
Candidate Damage 
Catagories Strateges Mechanisms 
Pipe Probabilityp ConsequentRisk Pipe Net 
Condition of U ump Cost of of Replacement Present 
se Rupture RuptureCost Value Rupture 
Poor Lower 
$500 Calculate $100 Calculate 
Run 0.7 Floor@ 
Corrosion 
0.9 
Replace Good 0.1 Upper $1000 
Floor@ 
Node 0.1 
Type 
Decision Chance ChanceChance Value Value Value Value 
8.3.2 STRATEGY FORMING 
The alternate strategies that arc contemplated must be investigated for the 
outcomes. An alternate strategy selection table is drawn with all the constituents. Starting 
from the left of the table, a strategy is selected and its associated chain is circled with one 
color. Similarly the other strategy is selected and its associates are circled in different 
color. This table will form the basis for drawing the influence diagram. Table 8.4 
illustrates the concept. The first candidate strategy 'Run' is circled in green. The damage 
mechanism associated with this strategy is circled in green. Each successive alternative 
choice or outcomes associated "run/corrosion/0.7 rupture probability(candidate/failure 
mechanism/failure probability) are circled in green. Some alternatives apply to both. 
When all the green circle categories are linked, the "Run" strategy is developed. 
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Similarly the "Replace" strategy and associated alternatives are circled in red to identify 
the "Replace" strategy . 
Table 8.4. Strategy Alternatives for Pump 
Candidate Damage 
Strateges Mechanisms Catagories 
Pipe Probabilityp ConsequentRisk Pipe Net 
Condition of ump Cost of of Replacement Present 
Ru tureCost Value 
Type 
Decision Chance ChanceChance Value Value Value Value 
8.4 INFLUENCE DIAGRAM 
The influence diagram is a layout. It is a re!ationship picture of strategy alternatives, 
their outcomes, consequences, the value of the consequences and the financial outcome. 
The following are the steps to draw the influence diagrams. 
1. Draw each node from the strategy table in time ordered fashion from left to right. 
2. Start at the right most node which is the financial outcome (NPV) and ask the 
question what is required to get to this node. 
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3. If the existing node in the layout to the left is what is required, then connect a line 
to that node. If any other node is needed bring it in and connect with a line. 
4. Keep asking the question 'What is required for this node at each node and 
connect the related node with a line till the left most node is reached. The left 
most node will be the strategy alternative. 
5. Tip the lines with arrows in the process flow direction which is )eft to right. 
The value nodes are green bordered rectangles. The chance nodes are ellipses. The 
decision nodes are red bordered rectangles. Figure 8.5 shows a conceptual influence 
diagram. 
Strategy 
Disicion 
8.5 DECISION TREE 
Replacement 
Cost 
Figure 8.5 Conceptuallntluence Diagram 
Net Present 
Value 
The decision tree describes in a time ordered fashion the choices and the 
consequences or the outcomes produced by each choice. The influence diagram 
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establishes relationship between categories. The decision tree, Table 8.5 clarifies the time 
order of the decision/consequence sequences among the categories and alternatives. It is 
time ordered from left to right showing that the results of the choices made, as the results 
are not known till they are implemented. 
Table 8.5 Decision Tree 
Strategy 
Decision 
8.6 DECISION MODEL 
Consequential 
Cost of Ru 
The decision model is shown in Table 8.6. The relationships and the inputs that 
were established thus far in the process is used to calculate the present value for each 
strategy. The basic strategy is no change strategy. This means that the pump is run with 
the corroded pipe. The probability of failure is 0.9. This is the worst case scenario. 
The total consequential cost is 0.9x500 + 0.1 x 1000 = 550. 
Therefore the risk of rupture is 0.7x 550 = 385 
This strategy involves no other cost. 
Therefore, the present value = $385 
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The alternate strategy is replace the pipe at a cost of $1 00 
The total consequential cost is 0.9 xSOO + 0.1 x 1000 = 550 
After pipe replacement the cost is 550x0.1 = 55 
Net Positive value must be positive for pipe replacement 
NPVis 
Loss due to corroded pipe - (pipe replacement cost + Loss due to pipe replacement) 
Substituting, 
385- (100 +55)= $230 =Overall Risk 
Table 8.6. Decision Model 
tmtegy Probability Pump Expected Risk Decision Pipe of Use Con.~equent of Present Net Present Condition Rupture Cost of Rupture Value Value 
Rupture 
Run Poor 0.7 $550 $385 $385 
Alternatives 
Run Poor 0.7 Lower $500 
Floor@ 
0.9 
Replace Good Upper $1000 $155 $235 Floor@ 
0.1 Pipe 
Replacement 
Cost 
SIOO 
The net present value indicates that the alternate is good while considering the base 
case of running the pump with a corroded pipe and its consequential costs. The alternate 
consists of expenses for replacement and any consequential costs due to replacement. In 
this case the NPV is positive. If there are several alternatives, then the alternate solution 
that provides maximum NPV should be selected for implementation. 
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8.7 INSPECTION PROGRAM FOR WATERWALL 
The waterwall failure ~at~ was analyzed earlier. The most cost effective way will be 
determined to check whether the predictions arrived at for the failure probability of 
waterwalls are true. At Holyrood Generating Station eight blisters were noticed during an 
inspection of the furnace. A month later there was tube failure due to Hydrogen damage. 
On further inspection, blisters were noticed on the eastern wall of the furnace. Hence a 
detailed inspection of the waterwall was decided. An inspection optimization program is 
developed for the waterwall at a boiler in Holyrood Generating Thermal Power Plant. 
The following is a real case study. 
8.7.1 STRATEGY TABLE 
The development of a decision model for the waterwall inspection starts from the 
strategy table. The waterwall failure is loss of tube thickness due to hydrogen damage 
caused by internal deposits. There are two items of interest. One is tube thickness 
measurement and the other is measurement of variation in tube internal thickness. A 
small "D" meter( digital thickness measuring meter) which is a hand held ultrasonic 
thickness measuring instrument with a probe and a digital read out, can be used to 
measure tube thickness or a Low Frequency Electromagnetic Technique can be 
employed. The variation in tube thickness is measured by a ultrasonic flaw detector. The 
test locations and who will do the thickness measurement needs to be considered. 
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8.7.2 CANDIDATE STRATEGIES AND DAMAGE MECHANISMS 
The following are the candidate strategies: 
1. No Inspection (Base Case). 
2. D Meter Thickness Meter. 
3. Low Frequency Electromagnetic Technique. 
4. Ultrasonic Flaw Detector. 
The damage mechanism is hydrogen damage. The aim of the inspection is to find out 
how much damage has occurred in the waterwalls. 
8.7.3 INSPECTION STRATEGY CATEGORIES 
The goal of the decision model is to choose the ultimate strategy. The first step is to list 
the categories as explained in 8.1.1. 
The categories (Decision making parameters) in Table 8.7 for waterwall tubes are: 
1. Net Present Value 
2. Probability of failure 
3. Probability of failure if no defect is reported 
4. Number tubes for inspection 
5. Tube Elevations 
6. Waterwall access 
7. Contract or in house workforce 
8. Boiler outage time 
9. Cost of power purchased during boiler outage 
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Table 8.7 Ordered Categories 
Candidate Damage 
StrateQies Mechanisms Categories 
Probability o Probability of 
!Access to 
~onseque 
Failure Number of Failure Given Number of In-house [ntlal Time 
Today Based Inspection Elevations to ro Defect tr"ube he or Contrac lfor 
Q_n Trend sensitivity_ Inspect Reoorted Elements k;omoonen ln~p_ectons Shutdown 
No lnsoectlon 
Dmeter 
hickness Hydrogen 
meter Damage 
LFET 
Node Type 
Decision Value !value Decision !value !value Decision Decision lvalue 
8.7.4 DECISION NODES 
There are three nodes. They are: 
1. Decision Nodes: Defines the category that is to be selected for developing the 
inspection program. If there are choices in a category, a decision is needed to go 
ahead in the process. Example: Whether 'D' Meter or Low Frequency 
Electromagnetic Technique. 
2. Chance Nodes: When a category's outcome is uncertain and can not be 
determined, it is called a chance node. Example: The failure data is a chance 
node because it is an uncertain parameter. 
3. Value Nodes: When a numerical data is needed for a category it is called a value 
node. Example: Sensitivity of inspection is a value node because there is a 
numerical value to how far the inspection measurement variations will affect 
NPV. 
183 
Chapter 8: Inspection Program Optimization 
8.7.5 ALTERNATIVE CHOICES 
A decision is to be made as to which category is chosen and their consequences. 
The corresponding categories are linked. To differentiate colored lines and borders are 
used to group them. Refer to Table 8.8. Each colour denotes an option. No inspection is 
green and therefore there is no NPV for this option. There is no green circle on NPV. 
8.7.6 INFLUENCE DIAGRAM 
This diagram shows Fig 8.6 how the categories are influenced and by what. It is 
drawn from right to left. The category on the far right is chosen. In this case the category 
on the far right is the NPV and the category preceding NPV is drawn to the left of NPV. 
The category to the left ofNPV is arrived at after asking the question, 'What is needed to 
produce NPV?' Similarly each category is located in the influence diagram and they are 
linked to the consequent categories. 
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Table 8.8 Strategy Alternatives 
Candidate 
Strateoies 
No 
lrispe..c_ti,gJJ 
/ " ( \ 
P meter (f 
I' 
Damage 
Mechanisms 
Number 
ofTurbe 
Elements 
Probability 
of Failure 
Today 
Based on 
Trend 
Inspection 
sensitivi 
Cateaories 
Probability of 
Failure Given 
no Defect 
Reported 
Access to the 
component 
///-----~\1;//- ~"----,,,\ ~
' ,, \ ' " 
Net 
Present 
value 
~n\.. \~·. . --~,\\ 
\ \ \ I / • /.) \' 
_ 20'Y~l 100% of_~'\,, 2@50% Effective hrs~~-~'~ _ _.Qal / ate~, skyclimber@ ,$1,000 Calr!t.llate 
~--,::__ · -t50%o~at~,_~Qj) "'-~ ___ ...--0/ ::2 ~ 90% of Actua~ 
"'-- 100% of A9ltJal 
~1-10%-orActual 
~· 
NodeTvoe 
Decision Value Value Chance Decision Value Decision Value 
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Inspection 
Strategy 
Probability 
of Failure 
Today 
Based on 
Trend 
Number of 
Elevations 
Probability of 
Failure Given 
-----111111~1 No Defect 
Reported 
Access to 
Component 
Opportunity 
Lost Cost 
per Hour 
Expected 
Consequential 
I IIIII Cost 
Inhouse or 
Contract 
Inspector 
Figure 8.6: Influence Diagram for waterwall 
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8.7.7 DECISION TREE 
The decision tree Table 8.9 consists of chance and decision categories. The 
categories are tabled in a time ordered fashion. Therefore the strategy decision to go 
without inspection, or D Meter or LFET is the starting point of the tree. The other 
categories are placed to the right as the consequence of the preceding decision 
category. The consequent categories placed on the right are separated from the left by 
a black line. The vertical length indicates the decision or the decision which causes 
the consequence. 
Table 8.9 Decision Tree for Waterwall 
Inspection 
Strategy 
Inspection 
Sensitivity 
~~~!~;: Access to 
to Inspect Component 
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8.7.8 DECISION MODEL 
The decision model is laid out in an Excel spreadsheet. The cells from left to 
right contain the categories in the time ordered sequence. The multiple variables for 
each category is taken from the decision tree. The relationships between the 
categories are expressed as formulas and the values are calculated. The Decision 
Model has been developed to find the maximum Net Present Value. The plant has 
various options with regard to the inspection of the waterwall. The plant may be under 
the impression that inspecting one elevation only may be cost saving. The plant can 
also consider engaging contractors using a basic thickness measuring instrument such 
as a D Meter. Similarly the plant management has other options such as increasing the 
inspection to second elevation with either contractors being paid on a hourly basis or 
on a lumpsum basis. In view of the many options available to the plant management 
Net Present Value for all options should be calculated to obtain the optimum 
inspection plan. Therefore, Net Present Values for the following options are 
calculated. 
1. D Meter for one elevation. 
2. D Meter for two elevations. 
3. D Meter for four elevations. 
4. LFET for one elevation. 
5. LFET for two elevations. 
6. LFET for four elevations. 
The spreadsheet for the above six combinations are attached in appendices A, B and 
C. However a sample calculation for using LFET on four elevations is shown below: 
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8. 8 INSPECTION OPTIMIZATION USING LFET ON FOUR ELEVATIONS 
The following steps are calculated in a spreadsheet. A sample calculation for 
using a LFET instrument at four elevations is explained below: 
8.8.1 PROBABILITY OFF AlLURE 
The probability of failure for waterwalls is obtained from the data analysis of 
waterwalls. The failure probability for the running hours till the year 2006 is 
calculated. 
Table 8.10 illustrates the parameters. 
Table 8.10: Data Analysis for 99100 hours Waterwall Service 
Shape Intercept Characteristic Running Reliability Failure Parameter life hours Probability 
12 -139.6 112795 99100 0.80 0.20 
The probability failure is taken as 20% for the waterwalls considering the running 
hours till April 2006 with the base year as 1995. 
8.8.2 SENSITIVITY OF INSPECTION 
The effect of sensitivity of inspection on the Net Present Value is taken from 
ASME Handbook on 'Risk Based Methods for Life Management' 
The Sensitivity is as below: 
1. ForD Meter 
• 90% of actual at 25% 
• 110% of actual at 50% 
• 130% of actual at 25% 
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2. ForLFET 
• 90% of actual at 25% 
• 100% of actual at 50% 
• 11 0% of actual at 25% 
When using D Meter for measuring the thickness of the tubes the sensitivity is 
calculated for a 20% Failure Probability as 
0.25 X 0.2 ><0.9 + 0.5 X 0.2 X 1.1 + 1.3 X 0.2 X 0.25 = 0.22 
Similarly when using TS-LFET the sensitivity is calculated for a Failure Probability 
as 
0.9X 0.2 X 0.25 +} X 0.2 X 0.5 + }.} X 0.2 X 0.25 = 0.2 
8.8.3 PROBABILITY OF FAILURE, GIVEN NO DEFECT IS REPORTED 
The Probability of Failure Given No defect is reported as follows: 
When measuring in one elevation only, the Probability of Failure is 
0.2 x (1- 0.25) = 0.15, as the measurement is effective in 25% at one elevation 
When measuring two elevations only the Probability of Failure is 
0.2x (1- 0.5) = 0.1, as the measurement is effective in 50% at two elevation 
When measuring four elevations the Probability of Failure is 
0.2 x ( 1- 0.8) = 0.04, as the measurement is effective in 80% at four elevation 
8.8.4 NET PRESENT VALUE CALCULATION 
Access to four elevations is $32,000 paid for building scaffolding 
Contractor uses LFET instrument to measure tube thickness in four elevations for 120 
tubes at a lump sum price of$71,000 for 100 hours. 
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Therefore Inspection cost is $103,000. 
Outage time for a waterwall failure = 72 hours 
Additional Cost ofrunning Gas Turbine to make good the lost production 175MW for 
72 hours=$ 819,000 at $65 per MWH. 
Expected consequential cost for 120 tubes when nothing is done ie no inspection is 
120x0.2x72x 11375 = $19,656,000. 
When inspection is carried out at four elevations using a LFET instrument, the 
expected consequential cost is calculated as below: 
120x0.04x72x11,375 = $3,931,200 ($11,375 being the cost of running the gas turbine 
per hour to produce 175 MW.) 
To calculate Present Value the cost of inspection should be added to the consequential 
cost 
Therefore Present Value= 3,931,200 + 103,000 = $ 4,034,200. 
Net Present Value= Expected Consequential Cost- Present Value 
Substituting, NPV = 19,656,000- 4,034,200 = $15,621,800. 
Similarly NPV for all combinations are calculated. NPV obtained for all combinations 
are tabulated below: 
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Table 8.11: Present Value Combinations 
Strategy Present Value 
1- Elevation 2- Elevations 4 - Elevations 
No Inspection $19,656,000 $19,656,000 $19,656,000 
D Meter $16,268,200 $10,882,800 $4,436,320 
LFET $14,844,300 $9,930,300 $4,033,500 
Table 8.12: Net Present Value Combinations 
Strategy Net Present Value 
1- Elevation 2- Elevations 4 - Elevations 
D Meter $3,387,800 $8,773,200 $15,219,680 
LFET $4,811,700 $9,725,700 $15,621,800 
From the above Net Present Value combination table, it is found that the best 
inspection strategy would be using a Low Frequency Electromagnetic Technique 
thickness measuring instrument for four elevations as this strategy produces the 
maximum Net Present Value. 
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8.9 SUMMARY OF INSPECTION OPTIMIIZATION 
The important points of the optimized inspection program as calculated in the 
preceding sections is as follows: 
1. Low Frequency Electromagnetic Technique will be used for thickness 
measurement of waterwall tubes. 
2. The thickness of the tubes from elevation -1 to elevation-4 will be measured. 
3. The lumpsum payment of $70,000 is advantageous than contracting on hourly 
basis. 
4. The time taken to measure the thickness of the tubes is less when Low 
Frequency Electromagnetic instrument is used. 
The optimization arrived at by developing a decision model to calculate the 
maximum Net Present Value, has provided a direction to choose the most 
beneficial combination of options for plant. The optimization models in 
Microsoft Excel Spreadsheets are attached as Appendices A, B and C. 
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 CONCLUSIONS 
Thermal power plants generally, have a preventive maintenance program. 
Periodically, components in the plants are inspected and either repaired or replaced. 
When replacement is contemplated, a budget provision is made for a certain year. In this 
method there is no scientific analysis for either replacement or inspection. The most cost 
effective time to replace a component is not thought about. The best means of inspection 
are rarely analyzed. 
Many power plants have data acquisition systems which store every trip and start up 
of equipment. The Power Plants use these data to report on the availability of power 
generating units. Rarely are these data used for any valuable analysis such as assessment 
or risk based decision making. This thesis has used the equipment trip and start up data to 
estimate the risk factor which is later used in component replacement and inspection 
optimization. 
Qualitative Analysis 
The failure data of important equipment were qualitatively analyzed. The failure 
data of components that caused an outage of the generating unit were selected for 
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analysis. The generating units had to be shut down whenever there was a leak in one of 
the furnace water wall tubes. Similarly, a leak in the superheater tube or the reheater tube 
contributed to a shut down and unavailability. A forced draft fan failure resulted in a 50% 
loss of power generation. Similarly, a boiler feed pump failure, boiler feed pump 
recirculation valve failure and a condenser tube failure also contributed to 50% loss of 
power generation. The failure data of these components were qualitatively analyzed and a 
risk matrix was drawn. The risk matrix drew attention to components with least failure 
probability and unacceptable consequences as well as components with least 
consequences and unacceptable failure probabilities. Both the failure rate and the 
consequence of failure for a waterwall tube are high. Both the failure rate of a feed water 
heater and its consequence severity are low. The failure rate of a forced draft fan was 
found to be low with medium consequence severity. 
Maintenance Optimization 
The failure rates of waterwall, superheater, reheater, forced draft fan, boiler feed 
pump, boiler feed pump recirculation valve, and condenser tubes were quantitatively 
analyzed using a least squares approach and a Weibull distribution. Mean time to failure 
(MTTF) was calculated for each of the above mentioned components. The MTTF 
provided the number of times a component would fail and this information was used to 
forecast the economic consequences when the component aged. Though the failure rate 
forecast was not exact, it did provide a good estimate for the minimum number of 
expected failures. The concept of Net Present Value was used to determine the most cost 
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effective time for replacing the aging component. Thus, this work has shown that a 
combined use of the Net Present Value and the failure rate obtained from a Weibull 
distribution derived from the component failure times can provide information as to the 
optimum time for the replacement of a defective component. 
Inspection Optimization 
All the decisions, actions, the financial implications that go into planning an 
inspection of waterwall tubes were analyzed using, influence diagrams, decision trees and 
a decision model. An inspection optimization program was developed for waterwall 
inspection. A decision had to be made whether to choose a digital ultrasonic thickness 
measuring instrument or a low frequency electromagnetic technique thickness measuring 
instrument. Similarly, decisions had to be made with regards to employing in plant 
inspectors or contract inspectors. The question of access to the waterwall tubes had to be 
decided, whether by means of scaffolding or sky climber. The number of elevations/tubes 
to inspect was also a question to be settled. Net Present Value was the deciding factor in 
arriving at a decision for choosing the best option. The Net Present Value was maximum 
when choosing to inspect four elevations, with scaffolding and contract inspectors using 
low frequency electromagnetic instrument to measure tube thickness. The Net Present 
Values were $15,622,500 for four elevation inspection, $9,760,500 for two elevation 
inspection and $4,864,250 for one elevation. Obviously, the inspection program that 
yields the maximum NPV is the preferred method for waterwall inspection. 
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Application of Weibull Distribution 
The Weibull distribution was selected from among a number of candidate 
distributions because of its ability to provide reasonably accurate failure analysis using a 
small number of data points. This was proven in the case of reheater. The reheater had 
failed only three times but the regression coefficient r2 for Weibull distribution was found 
to be 0.83. The required regression coefficient for a good fit for 2 parameter Weibull 
distribution with three failure data is 0. 78. Thus a methodology to analyze failure data has 
been established. 
ASME Guidelines 
The applicability of the ASME Guidelines to risk management has been 
demonstrated in this thesis by applying simple procedures with the aid of Microsoft 
Excel. 
9.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The procedure adopted in this thesis can be improved by including the following 
recommendations in the analysis. The recommendations are: 
1. Sensitivity Analysis should be done to ascertain which inputs influence the 
Decision Model. When such inputs are found care has to be exercised in 
obtaining this input 
2. Human Error Probability should be calculated for every failure and 
incorporated in the analysis. 
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3. Possibility of using Bayesian Methodology to remove uncertainty should be 
explored. 
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